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PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN THE ADOPTION OF
INTERPRETIVE RULES AND
POLICY STATEMENTS
Michael Asimow*t

The Internal Revenue Service ruled that private hospitals need not
offer free or below-cost medical services to the poor in order to maintain their tax-exempt status. 1 This ruling reversed the Service's prior
position and presumably resulted in a substantial reduction in the
availability of affordable hospital care to poor people. 2 The United
States Parole Board adopted guidelines establishing criteria for parole
decisions and specifying the range of months a federal prisoner must
serve before his release from prison. 3 The Immigration and Naturalization Service changed its instructions to district directors concerning
the effect of an alien's marriage on his deportation. As a result of
the new directive, the marriage of a deportable alien to a resident alien
would no longer be the basis for an indefinite extension of deportation. 4
Each of these administrative rules had important and immediate
consequences for an appreciable number of persons. The rules had a
definite impact on access to medical care, -terms in federal prisons,
and residency in the United States. Yet in none of these instances
* Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles. B.S. 1961, University of California at Los Angeles; LL.B. 1964, University of California at Berkeley.
-Ed.
t This article is based upon my report as consultant for the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information of the Administrative Conference of the United
States. The proposals made in this article have been accepted in substance by the
Conference in Recommendation 76-5, quoted in note 266 infra.
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Charles Hom of the Administrative Conference staff in conducting interviews. I have benefited greatly
from the views of Norman Abrams, Kenneth Davis, Steve Williams, Arthur Bonfield,
and David Minge, who read the manuscript, and from the informed criticism of the
members of the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information.
1. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
2. See Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976), discussed in text at notes
145-57 infra.
3. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.18-.20 (1975). See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole, 507
F.2d 1107, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1974), discussed in text at notes 120-32 infra. See generally Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE
L.J. 810 (1975).
4. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
824 (1976), discussed in text at notes 82-87 infra.
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did the agency give any prior notice that it was considering a new
rule or permit the public to comment before its adoption. This lack
of procedure contrasts sharply with the requirements for most rulemaking under section 4 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
which prescribes preadoption notice to the public and an opportunity
for interested persons to comment on the proposed rule.
In each case, the agency's failure to involve the public in the formation of its rule had a plausible basis: the exceptions in the APA's
rule-making provision for interpretive0 rules or policy statements. 7
Although interpretive rules of general applicability and general policy
statements must be published in the Federal Register, 8 the APA sets
5. (a) This section applies, accordingly to the provisions thereof, except to the
extent that there is involved( 1) a military or foreign affairs function of the United States; or
(2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts.
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally
served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in accordance with law. The notice shall include( 1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making
proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed;
and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description
of the subjects and issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not
apply(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of
agency organization, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding
and a brief statement of reasons therefore in the rules issued) that notice and
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the
public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of
written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing, sections 556 and 557 of this title apply instead
of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made
not less than 30 days before its effective date, except( 1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretative rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with. the rule.
(e) Each agency shall give an interested person the right to petition for the
issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970).
6. Although the APA uses the term "interpretative," the author prefers the word
"interpretive" for stylistic reasons. For an example of a statute using the word "interpretive," see Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57(a)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A), (d)(2) (1970).
8. 5 U.S.C. § .552(a) (1) (D) (1970).
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forth no procedural formalities for their adoption.° For purposes of
this article, an "interpretive rule" clarifies the meaning of language
in statutes or other rules without creating legally binding rights or
obligations, and a "policy statement" indicates how the agency will
exercise a discretionary function. Both types of administrative pronouncements ("nonlegislative rules")10 are to be contrasted with
administratively enacted "legislative rules," 11 which prescribe rights
or obligations binding on both 1:he agency and the public.
Section I of this article surveys the practices of a selected group
of federal agencies in the adoption of interpretive rules and policy
statements. It emphasizes the importance of these rules both to members of the public and to the administrative process. Section II analyzes the cases that have considered the APA exemption of interpretive rules and policy statements from preadoption notice and comment
procedures. These cases are in disarray for several reasons. For one
thing, the bright lines traditionally assumed to distinguish interpretive
rules and policy statements from legislative rules have become blurred
and indistinct. Moreover, the courts have become sensitive to the
public's need to take part in the rule-making process and have increasingly required procedural innovations at the agency level. As
section II shows, two inconsistent lines of case law have emerged. In
one group of cases, the courts have analyzed the "legal effect" of the
rule and have deferred to the agency's own categorization of its rule.
In the second group, the courts have concentrated on the practical
effect of the rule and have required preadoption procedures for rules
that have a "substantial impact" on the public. Unfortunately, the
9. For discussion of this exemption, see K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE
SEVENTIES 138-66, 193-205 (1976); Bonfield, ,Some Tentative Thoughts on Public
Participation in the Making of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy
Under the A.P.A., 23 AD. L. REv. 101 (1971); Javaras, Krane & Levin, Public Hearings for Private Rulings: A Dissent, 50 TAXES 160 (1972); Koch, Public Procedures
for the Promulgation of Interpretative Rules and General Statements of Policy, 64
GEO. L.J. 1047 (1976); Note, Administrative Law-The Legislative-Interpretative
Distinction: Semantical Feinting with an Exception to Rulemaking Procedures, 54
N.C.L. REV. 421 (1976); Comment, A Functional Approach to the Applicability of
Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act to Agency Statements of Policy, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 430 (1976) (a particularly thoughtful comment); Comment, Revenue
Rulings and the Administrative Procedure Act, 1975 Wis. L. REV. 1135.
10. There is no doubt that both policy statements and interpretive rules are
"rules" under the APA. A "rule" is defined as "the whole or a part of an agency
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.••. " 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970) (emphasis added).
11. Although the term "substantive rule" appears more frequently in judicial decisions, the author prefers the term "legislative rule." The term "substantive," which
implies a distinction from "procedural," is confusing in this context. None of the
rules considered in this paper-interpretive rules, policy statements, or legislative
rules-are procedural; rather, all relate to substance.
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first group of cases fails to give sufficient attention to the public's need
to participate in the rule-making process, while the second is difficult
to reconcile with the APA and produces unpredictable results. Section
III of this article returns to the problem of the distinction between
legislative and interpretive rules and emphasizes the increasing irrelevance of the distinction. Finally, section IV proposes a new postadoption procedure for the formulation of interpretive rules of general
applicability and general policy statements. It is hoped that these
procedures accommodate the conflicting needs of the public to influence agency nonlegislative rulemaking and of the agency to be
free from excessive procedural rigidity.

I.

THE ROLE OF INTERPRETIVE RULES AND

POLICY STATEMENTS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

This section of the article summarizes the nonlegislative rulemaking practices of four representative federal agencies: the Internal
Revenue Service, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Federal
Communications Commission, and Federal Trade Commission. 12
This analysis should convey an understanding of the indispensability
of interpretive rules and policy statements to effective administration
and their enormous practical impact on the public.
A.

Rule-Making Practices of the Federal Agencies

1. Internal Revenue Service (IRS)

In considering the rule-making procedures of the IRS, it is necessary to distinguish between "regulations" and other rules. The familiar IRS regulations13 seem to be a mixture of legislative and interpretive rules, but this distinction has no procedural importance. The
adoption of virtually all new or amended regulations on substantive
tax matters is accompanied by prior notice and comment procedures.
Thus, appellate courts concerned with the validity of IRS regulations
12. Some of the material presented in this section is drawn from interviews conducted at the four agencies. Interviews were also conducted with the staffs of six
other agencies: the Food and Drug Administration, Federal Power Commission,
Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, Securities and Exchange Commission, and the United States
Board of Parole. For a description of the rule-making practices of these agencies,
see my consultant's report to the Committee on Rulemaking and Public Information
of the Administrative Conference of the United States.
The interviews covered such matters as the purposes for which interpretive rules
and policy statements are used, the procedures used in adopting them, and the staff's
attitude toward the desirability of additional procedures. Reference is made to these
interviews throughout the article without citation.
13, Treas. Reg. §§ 1.0-601.702 (1976),
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seldom need to decide whether the regulation is legislative or interpretive.
However, the IRS adopts many other nonlegislative rules of general applicability. For example, it issues about 700 revenue rulings
each year, 14 which typically apply tax statutes, regulations, or prior
rulings to particular facts. These rulings, published in the Cumulative Bulletin, are adopted without prior notice or opportunity for
public comment and bind the IRS as a matter of policy. 15 Although
many rulings seem fairly trivial, others unquestionably have great
public impact and most have significance for at least a few taxpayers.
For example, the ruling mentioned at the beginning of this article, 16
which established that tax-exempt private hospitals need not give free
or below-cost service to the poor, had a great impact on health care
delivery. Other particularly important revenue rulings announced the
Service's position on ,the deductibility of prepaid interest17 and of
expenditures for cattle feed, 18 and eliminated the popular educational benefit trust device. 19
The Service also issues about fifty revenue procedures annually.
These appear to be policy statements, since they indicate how the IRS
intends to exercise its discretion. For example, a revenue procedure
is often used to indicate the circumstances in which the Service will
give a favorable private ruling. 20 Since such private rulings are
virtually indispensable for certain kinds of transactions, the revenue
procedure as a practical matter establishes law. The recent revenue
procedures that set ground rules for the use of limited partnerships
as tax shelters21 are prime examples of policy statements that have
a large practical impact on private affairs. Finally, the IRS Manual
contains interpretive rules and policy statements along with many
procedural instructions to the Service's staff. 22
The interpretive rules and policy sfatements adopted by the IRS
14. See generally Comment, 1975 Wis. L. R.Ev. 1135, supra note 9.
15. Rev. Proc. 72-1, §§ 6.013-.015, 1972-1 C.B. 694-95. See generally Rogovin,
The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance, Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756 (1956).
16. See text at notes 1-2 supra & notes 145-57 infra and accompanying text.
17. See Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2 C.B. 76; Andrew Sandor, 62 T.C. 469 (1974),
affd. per curiam, 536 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1976).
18. Rev. Ru!. 73-530, reissued as Rev. Rul. 75-152, 1975-1 C. B. 144. See Cattle
Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 83,067 (W.D. Okla.), revd. on
other grounds, 504 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
19. See Rev. Ru!. 75-448, 1975-2 C.B. 55.
20. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 74-26, 1974-2 C.B. 478.
21. See Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438; Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735.
22. See UNITED STATES INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL
§ 4562.2 (1975) (reasonable cause for filing of returns).
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benefit both taxpayers and the agency. They guide IRS personnel
in applying the law uniformly to taxpayers all over the country. In
addition, by clarifying the law, they reduce the number of inquiries
from taxpayers to which the IRS must respond. Finally, they conserve scarce IRS resources by deterring the very kinds of transactions
that would most likely be audited and that would probably lead to
litigation.
2.

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)

Like the IRS, the INS utilizes preadoption notice and comment
procedures when it adds to or alters both legislative and interpretive
rules published in the Code of Federal Regulations. But it also
makes extensive use of policy statements and interpretive rules by
issuing annually hundreds of operating instructions to staff. 23 The
INS has been gradually increasing the number of its rules that are
exposed to prior public comment, 24 but most of the staff instructions
are adopted without any public input.
The validity of adopting policy statements and interpretations
concerning immigration matters without prior public notice and comment has been frequently litigated. In each case, the rule appears
to have had a drastic impact on the affairs of significant numbers of
people. One case, referred to at the beginning of this article, 2 t1 involved an INS "operations instruction" concerning the effect of marriage on deportation. Another was a Labor Department field memorandum relating to live-in maids. 26 A third involved a Labor Department directive that revoked a convenient precer.tification procedure for aliens seeking visas to work in the United States. 27 And
a fourth involved an INS rule affecting the exclusion of alien students
from the labor certification provisions. 28 Finally, an operations instruction setting forth criteria for voluntary departure and indefinite
23. The Labor Department also issues many instructions and interpretations to
guide the INS in administering the provisions relating to labor certification of aliens.
They are generally adopted without any prior notice or comment procedures.
24. The INS personnel interviewed said that the input from the public was often
quite helpful to the agency.
25. See Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed in text at
note 4 supra & notes 82-87 infra and accompanying text; Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi,
389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975); Dimaren v. INS, 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
26. See Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1975).
27. See Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed
in text at notes 114-19, infra.
28. See Hou Ching Chow v. Attorney General, 362 F. Supp. 1288 (D,D.C,
1973).

January 1977]

Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements

527

extensions of voluntary departure29 has had great practical importance in day-to-day deportation proceedings.
3.

Federal Communications Commission (FCC)

While the FCC has long made extensive use of policy statements, it has been inconsistent in inviting public participation. 30
Among the many such FCC pronouncements that have had a dramatic effect on the interests of both licensees and the public are the
chain broadcasting report held ripe for review by the Supreme Court
in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States; 31 a 1965
statement on the criteria for selecting among applicants for a license
in a comparative hearing, 32 and a 1970 statement prescribing license
renewal criteria. 33 Other policy statements used by -the FCC are more
innocuous; they may simply be reminders to the industry of new statutes or well-established and noncontroversial points. 34
FCC staff members claim that policy statements have been used
because the policies lacked sufficient definitiveness to be expressed
in legislative rules. They deny that the FCC uses the policy statement
label to avoid the requirement of public participation or to facilitate
subsequent deviations from the statement. 35 Sometimes, however, as
in the case of the so-called personal attack rules, 36 legislative rules
are employed to announce new policy so that the sanction of statutory
forfeiture procedures can be invoked for violation of the rules. 37
29. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERVICE OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS§ 242.10.
30. For examples of policy statements in which public comments were solicited,
see 40 Fed. Reg. 25,689 (1975) (concerning agreements between broadcast licensees
and the public); 39 Fed. Reg. 39,395 (1974) (concerning children's television programs); 39 Fed. Reg. 26,371 (1974) (concerning the fairness doctrine and public
interest standards).
31. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
32. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
33. 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970). See Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447
F.2d 1201, 1204 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1971), which suggests in dictum that adoption of
this policy statement without public participation might have been invalid.
34. Cf. Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 914 (1973), involving the FCC's warning to licensees that they should
screen recorded music for lyrics that encourage drug use. 31 F.C.C.2d 377 (1971).
The court felt that the FCC was simply reminding licensees of an already existing
duty.
35. Professor Tomlinson suggests that one recent FCC decision was in the form
of a policy statement rather than a legislative rule so that it could be retroactive. See
E. Tomlinson, Final Report in Support of Recommendation on Strengthening the Informational and Notice Giving Functions of the Federal Register 33 n.80 (Dec. 31,
1975) (unpublished report for Administrative Conference of the United States).
36. See 41 C.F.R. § 73.123 (1976). These rules were upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
37. See 41 U.S.C. § 503(b) (1970); 18 F.C.C. 2d 240 (1969) (FCC's statement
on employment nondiscrimination rules).
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Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

In addition to its legislative trade regulation rules, the FTC issues
a substantial number of interpretive rules in the form of industry
guides. 38 These designate conduct that the FTC believes is unfair or
deceptive; they typically have a substantial impact on commercial
practices, since businesspersons in the affected industries generally
conform to them. The staff puts comparatively little effort into the
drafting of interpretive rules, which tend to be relatively vague and
comprehensive, unlike legislative rules, which are tightly drawn, very
specific, and cover relatively few points. Since 1958, the FTC has
adopted industry guides only after giving public notice and inviting
comments, 39 and interviews with the agency staff indicated that the
comments received were frequently quite helpful.
The new FTC statute clearly distinguishes interpretive and legislative rules. 40 Violation of legislative rules gives rise to liability for
steep civil penalties as well as to broad liabilities to the public, 41
but violation of interpretive rules cannot automatically trigger such
liabilities. 42 In FTC adjudication, interpretive and legislative rules
are sharply differentiated: If a person has violated an interpretive rule,
the FTC proceeds under the statute, using the rule as a likely but
not a necessary interpretation; but if the respondent has violated a
legislative rule, the FTC proceeds under the rule. 43 Thus, adjudication under a legislative rule is considerably less complex than under
an interpretive rule, since the agency must determine the meaning of
the statute in the latter case. However, in such a case, the agency
is almost certain to give great weight to its previously promulgated
interpretive rule; it is doubtful therefore that the results of applying
legislative and interpretive rules will often differ.
B.

The Interests of Agencies and the Public in
Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements

The preceding discussion of the practices of four agencies illus38. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 256 (1976) (guides for lawbook industry).
39. However, the FTC does not invite public comments before issuing its occasional enforcement policy statements, which indicate enforcement priorities for the
staff. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 14.9 (1976) (foreign language advertising); 36 Fed.
Reg. 12,058 (1971) (substantiation of advertising claims).
40. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 18(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. V.
1975), which distinguishes interpretive rules and policy statements from legislative
rules. The elaborate procedures prescribed for the adoption of legislative rules are
more detailed than those generally required by the APA.
41. Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5(m), 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (Supp. V. 1975).
42. Interpretive rules are explicitly exempted from these provisions. 15 U.S.C.
§ 45(m)(l)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
43. See 16 C.F.R. § 1.5 (1976).
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trates several fundamental points. First, interpretive rules and policy
statements are of great importance to the public in alerting them to
the agency's position on substantive matters. They frequently have
a substantial impact on the affairs of large segments of the public because they definitively affect the behavior of agencies and interested
persons or groups. In this respect they differ little from legislative
rules.
Second, interpretive rules and policy statements are indispensable
to proper administration. Agencies cannot perform effectively unless
they clarify the law through interpretive rules and channel their discretion through policy statements. Both kinds of rulemaking are
needed to guide the staff in administering the statute and in assisting
regulated persons to comply with the law. 44
Third, a number of agencies now make it their practice to provide
notice and comment procedures for many or even most of their generally applicable interpretive rules and policy statements. 45 This
practice has become prevalent at some agencies, appears occasionally
in others, and is unknown in still others. The trend toward the voluntary use of public participation has been influenced by several considerations. In response to recent cases requiring public participation
in the formulation of interpretive rules and policy statements that have
a "substantial impact,"46 personnel at some agencies have decided
that the costs of notice and comment procedures are preferable to the
uncertainties of litigation. Personnel at other agencies are genuinely
convinced of the value of public participation. They believe it produces better rules, increases judicial deference, and enhances the acceptability of the rules to the public. Still, the voluntary use of preadoption procedures is spotty. Unless there is either additional clarification by the courts of the ap2licable definitional standard or congressional revision of the APA, many agencies will continue to make
interpretive rules and policy statements without any public participation at all.
Finally, the interviews at many agencies suggest that agency personnel almost unanimously oppose any statute that would require the
standard preadoption notice and comment procedures for most or all
interpretive rules and policy statements. The staffs repeatedly
stressed that, if followed in good faith, such procedures would seri44. See generally E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 32-57.
45. For a discussion of the practices of the FCC and the FTC, see text at notes
30-43 supra. The Food and Drug Administration, Federal Power Commission, and
Securities and Exchange Commission also frequently utilize notice and comment procedures in connection with nonlegislative rulemaking.
46. See notes 108-57 infra and accompanying text.
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ously delay rulemaking and increase agency costs. Often the public
would have nothing useful to contribute, yet a proposed rule could
be delayed for many months, during which time uncertainty and
confusion would exist. Interviewed agency personnel cautioned
that the extra burdens of preadoption procedures would deter the promulgation of interpretive rules and policy statements and would force
the agency to find alternative ways to achieve the same result.
This consensus should counsel caution in espousing a repeal of
the present APA exemption for policy statements and interpretive
rules. Nevertheless, the present statute excludes the interested and
affected public from participation in the formulation of interpretations
and policy, except when the agency voluntarily provides notice and
comment procedures or a court intervenes. Therefore, a method
must be devised that reconciles the justifiable claims of the agencies
and the public whom they serve. After analyzing the confused case
law in this area, this article will propose a system for postadoption public commentary that offers prospects of reconciling these demands.
II.

JUDICIAL TESTS USED To DISTINGUISH

LEGISLATIVE AND NONLEGISLATIVE RULES

Under the APA, legislative and nonlegislative rules must be
sharply distinguished, since the Act requires full-fledged notice and
comment procedures prior to the adoption of legislative rules but
imposes no such requirements upon the adoption of nonlegislative
rules. 47 Yet the APA fails to define interpretive rules or policy statements, and, as a practical matter, it is often difficult to distinguish them
from legislative rules except by recourse to the agency's label. For
example, the FCC adopted a "policy statement" to prescribe the standard of service that a broadcaster must meet in order to have its license
renewed48 but adopted a "legislative rule" -to prescribe the equal
employment obligations of licensees. 49 Both pronouncements limited the FCC's discretion to decide what is in the public interest and
both had a substantial practical impact upon broadcasters, yet the
public was invited to participate only in the formulation of the legislative rule.
In recent years, members of the public have claimed that they
were entitled to notice and comment before the adoption of a rule
47. However, there is no distinction between legislative and nonlegislative rules
of general applicability on one important point; all must be published in the Federal
Register. S U.S.C. § 552(a)(l)(D) (1970).
48. See 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970).
49. See 18 F.C.C.2d 240 (1969).
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labelled by the agency as an interpretive rule or a policy statement.
Courts responding to these claims have adopted one of two inconsistent lines of analysis. According to one line of cases, a rule is
classified as legislative or nonlegislative on the basis of whether it
alters the legal rights or obligations of members of the public. The
courts in these cases generally defer to the agency's own categorization
of the rule. The standard developed in these cases will be referred
to in this article as the "legal effect" test. Courts in the second line
of cases pay far less attention to the agency's label or to the legal
effect of the rule; instead they decide whether the public was entitled to participate by weighing the public's need to do so. The
standard used in these cases will be referred to herein as the "substantial impact" test.
A.

The Legal Effect Standard

The legal effect test is based on the proposition that there exists
a fundamental difference in the legal consequences of legislative and
nonlegislative agency action. According to this test, legislative rules
alter the rights and obligations of members of -the public without
further action by the agency. Nonlegislative rules, on the other hand,
simply describe how the agency intends in the future to interpret law
or exercise discretion. Even though nonlegislative rules may have
drastic, self-executing effects on behavior, they nevertheless are not
"the law." Of course, the most obvious way to ascertain whether a
rule affects the public's rights and obligations is to determine how
the agency describes its rule; thus the courts rely heavily on the
agency's label. But the courts have also been guided by tests suggested by the reports of governmental committees, the legislative
history of the APA, and commentators. For purposes of discussion,
this section will treat separately the development of the legal effect
standard in cases involving policy statements and interpretive rules.

1. Policy Statements
A recent Second Circuit decision remarked that the distinction
between policy statements and legislative rules had become "enshrouded in considerable smog." 50 In a similar vein, the District
of Columbia Circuit thought the distinction was a "fuzzy product. "51 No one who reads the cases that have wrestled with this
50. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
824 (1976).
51. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974), quoting
1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 5.01, at 290 (1958). See Shapiro,
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problem would disagree with these characterizations. Although the
complaints are contemporary, the smog and fuzziness have been
present from the outset, for it has never been possible clearly to distinguish policy statements from legislative rules.
a. Tests suggested by committees and commentators. One early
standard under which the two types of rules might be distinguished52 was offered in the seminal report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Recommending that
general policy statements be published in the Federal Register, the
Committee described them this way:
Most agencies develop approaches ,to particular types of problems,
which as they become established, are generally determinative of decisions. . . . As soon as the "policies" of an agency become sufficiently articulated to serve as real guides to agency officials in their
treatment of concrete problems, that fact may advantageously be
brought to public attention by publication in a precise and regularized form. 53
This description is a helpful first effort, but it seems contradictory.
What did the Committee mean by "approac]Jes" to problems? If it
meant that a policy statement is tentative, rather than definitive, the
distinction may be workable. Yet confusion arises from the remainder of the Committee's description, which requires that the policy
be "sufficiently articulated to serve as a real guide to agency officials
. . . ." If the policy has reached that stage of concreteness, then there
may be little to distinguish it from a legislative rule that also guides
agency officials and the public. 54
The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of Administrative
Policy, 78 HARV. L. REV. 921, 930 (1965).
52. For an interesting early case on a policy statement, see Standard Computing
Scale Co. v. Farrell, 249 U.S. 571 (1919). State statutes provided for both a state
superintendent and local inspectors of weights and measures. After an investigation,
the state superintendent published a "bulletin" in which he said that scales "must"
be equipped with a device to compensate for temperature changes, Local inspectors
followed the bulletin and refused to "seal" plaintiffs scale, which lacked this device,
The Supreme Court held that the "bulletin" was not a "rule" and thus not subject to
any constitutional attack. It declared that the opinions and advice of those in authority are not a law or a regulation.
53. FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA·
TIVE PROCEDURE 26-27 (1941) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S CoMMITTEE REPORT].
54. The discussion of the dissenting members of the Committee is even less helpful. They proposed that an agency be compelled by statute to formulate and publish
a number of items including statements of policy: ''Where an agency acting under
general or specific legislation, has formulated or acts upon general policies not clearly
specified in legislation, so far as practicable such policies shall be formulated, stated,
published, and revised in the same manner as other rules." Id. at 225. This language was incorporated in the publication requirements of the legislation introduced
to implement the Committee's report. See S.614, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a), 87
CONG. REC, 333 (1941); S.918, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(b), 87 CONG, REC, 11S0
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The legislative history of the APA provides little guidance for developing a standard for defining policy statements, although it does
provide a clear statement of the rationale for the statutory exemption
for nonlegislative rules. 55 Presumably, the APA draftsmen were
guided by the rather vague description of policy statements in the Attorney General's Committee report. 56
The Attorney General's Manual on the Administrative Procedure
Act51 noted that general statements of policy are "statements issued
by an agency to advise the public prospectively of the manner in
which the agency proposes to exercise a discretionary power." 58
This definition is moderately useful. It uses the word "proposes,"
which again suggests that a policy statement is tentative rather than
definitive. It emphasizes that a policy statement relates to a discretionary power, whereas an interpretive rule construes statutes or rules.
Nevertheless, the definition tells little about how to distinguish
policy statements from those legislative rules that also address discretionary functions.
Several commentators have proposed tests for identifying policy
statements and distinguishing them from legislative rules. Professor
Bonfield, for example, has suggested that policy statements are those
rules addressed to the staff of the agency rather than to members of
the public. 59 Professor Davis, in contrast, argued that the rules
should be distinguished largely by reference to the label chosen by
the agency. 60 In a recent study for the Administrative Conference
of the United States, Professor Tomlinson suggested that policy statements are temporary measures designed to be replaced relatively
quickly by more definitive legislative rules. 61 Drawing upon a
number of recent cases, still another commentator suggested that, to
(1941), quoted in Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S.674, S.675, and S.918
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on tlze Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 27
(1941) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
55. See S. Doc. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1946), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1946, at 18 (1947) [hereinafter
cited as APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY], quoted in note 261 infra.
56. See note 53 supra.
57. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON TiiE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
(1947). The Manual was written in 1947, one year after the passage of the APA,
to explain its purpose and effect to administrative officials.
58. Id. at 30 n.3 (emphasis added). The District of Columbia Circuit accorded
this definition "considerable weight because of the very active role the Attorney
General played in the formulation and enactment of the APA." Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 38 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
59. See Bonfield, supra note 9, at 115.
60. K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 148.
61. See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 50. For a similar view, see K. DAVIS,
DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 102 (1969).
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determine which rules concerning discretionary functions should be
considered legislative rules, courts must analyze the substantiality of
a rule's effect on the public, the extent to which the public would
have a subsequent opportunity to influence the agency, the extent to
which public comment would help the agency, and considerations of
agency efficiency. 62
b. Judicial definitions. The first significant case to address the
problem of identifying policy statements was Airport Commission
of Forsyth County v. CAB, 63 which involved the requirement that
general policy statements be published in the Federal Register. The
Civil Aeronautics Board and the Federal Aviation Administration
jointly issued a press release setting forth a new policy concerning the centralization of airline routes into a single airport serving
several cities. However, the press release was not published in the
Federal Register, seemingly a clear-cut violation of section 3 of
the APA. 64 In an unpersuasive opinion, the Fourth Circuit held
that publication was not required, observing that the press release did
not set forth a rule that the public was required to obey or with which
it -had to avoid conflict. This test proved helpful to later courts
seeking to distinguish policy statements from legislative rules through
analysis of the legal effect of the rule.
A panel of the District of Columbia Circuit adopted the Forsyth
County analysis in the important 1974 case of Pacific Gas & Electric
Co. v. FPC. 65 The FPC required pipeline companies to file plans
establishing priorities during periods in which gas deliveries were to
be curtailed. The submitted plans reflected a wide range of views
on whether curtailments should occur according to the relative efficiencies of the end use of the gas or according to prior contractual
commitments. Consequently, the FPC issued Order 467, which it
-called a policy statement, explaining that curtailments should occur
according to a detailed priority list based on the efficiency of the end
use of the gas. There was no public participation in the formulation
of Order 467, and the court held that none was required. 66
62. See Comment, 43 U. CHI. L, REV, 430, supra note 9.
63. 300 F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962).
64. Section 3(a)(3) of the APA explicitly required publication of "statements of
general policy or interpretations of general applicability formulated and adopted by
the agency for the guidance of the public." Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324,
§ 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946). Although the language is different, the requirements of
the current version of the statute are the same. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1970),
See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 47-48.
65. 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Pacific Lighting Serv. Co. v. FPC,
518 F.2d 718 (1975).
66. -See 506 F,2d at 38.
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In reaching its decision, the court first spoke of the appropriate
role of policy statements in the administrative process. Policy statements, it observed, are anterior to both rulemaking and adjudication;
like press releases, they announce policy the agency hopes to implement in future rulemaking or adjudication. The publication of policy
statements permits public dissemination of the agency's policies prior
to actual application in particular situations and facilitates long-range
planning within the affected industry.
Turning to the problem of characterizing the rule, the court relied
on the Forsyth County test. It noted that a policy statement does
not establish a binding norm or make a final determination of any
issues or rights. The agency cannot apply or rely upon it as law and
must be prepared to support the policy when it is applied as if the
statement had never been issued. 67 Applying these principles, the
court determined that Order 467 had no final, inflexible impact upon
the petitioners. Deferring to the agency's characterization and
description of its action, the court noted that it had been consistently
described as a policy statement. The court also found it significant
that the order expressly envisaged future proceedings. It emphasized
as well the right of interested parties in subsequent adjudications to
challenge or support the policy through factual or legal presentations. 68 The FPC declared that the order prescribed only initial
guidelines as a means of facilitating curtailment planning and the adjudication of cases. Indeed, the court went out of its way to establish
that Order 467 would not even shift the burden of proof in subsequent curtailment cases and that the burden would remain on the
pipeline company. 69
The decision reached in Pacific Gas & Electric seems correct if
the standard for analysis is the legal effect of the policy statement.
Application of the factors suggested by the Attorney General's Committee report, prior cases, and commentators seems to suggest, on the
whole, the same result reached by the court:
67. See 506 F.2d at 38.
68. See 506 F.2d at 40-41.
69. See 506 F.2d at 43. The court could easily have held that Order 467 shifted
the burden of proof in subsequent proceedings to customers. Transwestem Pipeline
Co., 50 F.P.C. 343 (1973), affd. sub nom. Pacific Lighting Serv. v. FPC, 518 F.2d
718 (9th Cir. 1975), involved customers who protested the priority system generally
as well as the specific curtailment priorities. The FPC refused to order a hearing under section 4 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970), which would have
given the pipeline company the burden of proving the reasonableness of its plan, and
instead ordered a hearing under section 5, 15 U.S.C. § 717d (1970), which gave the
challengers the burden of proof. 50 F.P.C. at 344. Thus, Transwestern could easily
be read to indicate that Order 467 shifted the burden of proof and that the FPC had
little interest in any prompt reconsideration of the matter. But the Paci/ ic Gas &
Electric court brushed Transwestern aside. See 506 F.2d at 43 n.28.
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( 1) the order did not set forth a rule that the public must
obey;
(2) the FPC had consistently labelled the order as a policy
statement;
(3) the order used many tentative words, which suggests it
was a policy statement, although it was not clear whether the order
was permanent or temporary;70
( 4) it was not clear whether the statement was directed at the
FPC staff or at the public; and
( 5) aggrieved persons would have subsequent administrative
proceedings in which they could seek to change the agency's policy. 71
The discussion in Pacific Gas & Electric on the practical effect
of Order 467 is disappointingly thin. The court alluded to Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. United States, 72 in which a policy
statement drastically impaired a network's contracts and organization,
but said the "effect of Order 467 in the present case is not so direct or
immediate" 73 because there was no present abrogation of contractual
commitments. Such commitments would be affected only after actual
curtailment plans were filed and approved by the FPC, and even then
"[t]he possibility that petitioners might receive a lower curtailment
priority at some future time as the result of a subsequent tariff filing
does not compare with the significant and immediate impact of the
regulations in Columbia Broadcasting." 74
Admittedly, the effect of Order 467 was not as drastic as that of
the policy statement in Columbia Broadcasting. But surely the
impact of a policy statement should not have to reach that level of
severity before adversely affected parties are given the right to preadoption participation. Order 467 had an immediate effect on all
gas customers who had contractual commitments for deliveries, but
low priorities, and who had every reason to take the FPC's pronouncement seriously. The chance of obtaining a waiver in subsequent proceedings would have appeared to them to be extremely
slight. 75 Consequently, low priority customers had to begin an im70. These tests are suggested by Professors Bonfield and Tomlinson. See text at
notes 59-61 supra.
71. !See text at note 62 supra.
72. 316 U.S. 407 (1942).
73. 506 F.2d at 42.
74. 506 F.2d at 42.
75. A subsequent case, Consolidated Edison Co. v. FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), noted in 17 B.C. !Nous. & CoM. L. REV. 260 (1976), revealed that Order
467 would have an immediate effect. Both customers and pipeline companies who
wished to continue interim plans that did not comply with Order 467 were summarily
rejected by the FPC; thus, it was clear that filings in compliance with Order 467
would be accepted and all others would be suspended.
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mediate search for alternative energy sources, to negotiate long-range
commitments for other fuels, and to purchase equipment for burning
them. All this might well impair profits and affect a vast range of
investment decisions. Moreover, authoritative guidance from the FPC
was absolutely imperative for the pipeline companies, since FPC
approval of a plan abrogating existing contracts might be a defense
to contractual liability in state courts.
The court also held that it had no jurisdiction to review Order
467 substantively70 since the Order was not ripe for review under
the two criteria set forth in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner. 17 First,
it had no immediate and significant impact on petitioners because
it was tentative. There was no assurance that the Order would,
in fact, be imposed on each customer and pipeline, and thus any attending hardships seemed remote. Second, the issues were not
then deemed suitable for judicial review because there was no meaningful record. The contracts that were to be abrogated, for example,
were not in the record. The court's analysis of the ripeness question is unsatisfactory. The fact that Order 467 did not have a
binding legal impact on petitioners should not have been the sole
criterion on the hardship issue. In several -cases, practical business
harm, together with reasonable assurances that the policy would not
be reconsidered, has been considered a sufficient hardship. 78 The
lack of a record is a far more serious objection; indeed, the court
would have had considerable difficulty reviewing Order 467 since the
FPC's basis for adopting it was never disclosed. 79 There was neither
public comment, nor a statement of basis and purpose, nor any of
the usual helpful material used in reviewing rulemaking. 80
Pacific Gas & Electric clearly shows the inadequacy of 1:he present
statute and the legal effect test. Order 467 cried out for public participation, since great economic issues turned on it, and, as a practical
matter, it was definitive. For that same reason, moreover, immediate
76. Jurisdiction depended upon a statute that allowed review to "any party to a
proceeding [who is] aggrieved by an order· . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 717r(b) (1970).
Although the petitioners were considered "parties to a proceeding," Order 467 was
held not to be an "order" under the statute. The court conceded that "order''
includes both rules and adjudicative orders, and concluded that the standards
for identifying an "order" should be the same as those used fo~ deciding ripeness.
506 F.2d at 46-48.
77. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
78. See, e.g., National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d
689 (D.C. Cir. 1971); text at notes 219-29 infra.
19. See 17 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 260, supra note 75, at 280 & n.216.
80. For a discussion of the standards applied in judicial review of rulemaking,
see Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974).
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judicial review should have been available, yet the absence of a record
made it infeasible. 81
In 1975, a panel of the Second Circuit applied the legal effect
test in Noel v. Chapman. 82 Noel was an alien residing in New York
whose deportation had been ordered. He applied for and received
the privilege of voluntary departure but failed to leave. He then married a resident alien and applied for an indefinite extension of voluntary departure. The effect of his marriage was to exempt him from
the requirement of labor certification, but not to give him a preference
over other Western Hemisphere aliens seeking visas. In essence, the
indefinite extension he sought would have allowed him to remain with
his wife until a visa became available.
Voluntary departure can be granted to a deportable alien at the
discretion of the Attorney General. 83 By regulation, this authority
is lodged within the sole discretion of the various district directors of
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). 84 Between 1968
and 1972, these directors followed markedly different policies in
granting indefinite extensions to deportable aliens who had married
resident aliens; the New York director had been particularly generous. Because of the adverse impact of indefinite extensions on
the labor market, congressional pressure was exerted on the INS
to be stricter about granting them. Consequently, the INS instructed
all district directors that, as of July 31, 1972, such aliens should not
routinely be granted extensions and that relief should be afforded only
where warranted by compelling circumstances. On April 10, 1973,
the instruction was amended in part so that the former New York
policy would be applied nationwide. Unfortunately for Noel, however, the revised instruction applied only to marriages occurring
81. The Pacific Gas & Electric court made a dubious but intriguing observation
related to the scope of judicial review of policy statements. The court pointed to
the great deference accorded legislative rules by reviewing courts, and explained that
this was the result of the public's role in formulating them. For discussion of the
scope of judicial review accorded legislative rules, see text at notes 192-207 infra.
But a policy statement adopted without public participation is fundamentally different, and its underlying wisdom may be reassessed by the reviewing court. See 506
F.2d at 40. This suggests that if a policy statement were adopted with public participation, the scope of its judicial review would be sharply narrowed. This dictum
seems erroneous. If the agency has made a nonlegislative rule, plenary judicial review is appropriate, regardless of the procedural formalities attending its formulation.
A narrow scope of review is appropriate only when the agency is exercising delegated
legislative power. However, the degree to which the public participated could appro•
priately be considered by the court as one factor in deciding what deference it should
pay to the agency's expertise. See text at notes 214-15 infra.
82. 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1976).
83. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1970).
84. See 8 C.F.R. § 244.2 (1975).
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before April 10, 1973. Noel's marriage occurred three days too
late, so he was not within the scope of the amendment.
Noel sought to have the instructions declared a legislative rule and
therefore invalid for want of preadoption public notice and comment.
Remarking that the distinction between policy statements and legislative rules was "enshrouded in considerable smog," the court agreed
with the INS that they were policy statements, primarily because they
imposed no obligation on the public. 85 The court was influenced
by Professor Bonfield's view that policy statements are typically directed at the agency staff rather than at the public. If the criteria
for assessing the legal effect of the rule are considered, however, it
is unclear whether the court reached the correct result, since the criteria point in opposite directions:
( 1) the INS instructions did not set forth a standard that the
public had to obey, which suggests they amounted to a policy statement;
(2) the label given to the instructions was consistent with
treating them as a policy statement;
(3) there was nothing tentative about the instructions, and
they seemed permanent rather than temporary, which suggests they
were a legislative rule;
( 4) the instructions were directed at the staff, not the public,
which suggests they were a policy statement; and
( 5) aggrieved persons would have no opportunity to change
the view of the personnel who were responsible for making the deportation decision because the instructions definitively forebade the
staff from granting automatic extensions-a characteristic suggestive of a legislative rule.
The court recognized that several other courts had required public
participation in the formulation of rules that have a "substantial impact." But it declared that there could be no substantial impact without a change in "existing rights or obligations," which it found lacking
in the case before it. 86 As we shall see, however, the substantial impact cases do not require a change in legal rights or obligations. On
the contrary, they tum on the presence of substantial practical impact.
Even if the Noel court were correct in its reading of the substantial
impact cases, however, the INS instructions seem to have had an effect
on the legal rights of individuals like Noel. To be sure, no alien ever
had a legal right to require the district director to exercise discretion
favorably to him. Yet the established practice in New York where
85. 508 F.2d at 1030.
86. 508 F.2d at 1030.
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Noel lived had been routinely to grant indefinite extensions of deportation to married aliens. Before the agency terminated this practice
for deportable aliens married after a certain date, marriage meant an
indefinite extension, whereas afterwards marriage no longer sufficed.
A valuable status initially created by administrative action had now
been destroyed, in a manner and with an effect that surely resembles a
change in legal rights. Moreover, unlike the persons adversely affected by the rules in Forsyth County and Pacific Gas & Electric,
aliens such as Noel had no effective opportunity to protest the automatic application of INS policy in their cases. It would, therefore,
have been wholly defensible for the court to have labelled the INS
instructions a legislative rule even under the traditionally defined legal
effect test. 87
2.

Interpretive Rules

Interpretation is a vital administrative function that consists of
clarifying the meaning of statutes, prior regulations, case law, or other
87. If the definition of the phrase "general applicability and legal effect" provided
in the regulation relating to the Federal Register Act were applied, the instructions
in Noel might be considered to have had "legal effect." The phrase is defined as
"any document issued under proper authority prescribing a penalty or course of conduct, conferring a right, privilege, authority, or immunity, or imposing an obligation,
and relevant or applicable to the general public, members of a class, or persons in
a locality, as distinguished from named individuals or organization." 1 C.F.R. § 1.1
(1975) (emphasis added). If the word "withdrawing" were substituted for "conferring," it would appear that the instructions in Noel indeed had "legal effect." By
definitively altering the way in which a discretionary power could be exercised, the
INS seems to have withdrawn a "privilege" or an "immunity."
It is also of some interest that the INS personnel interviewed thought that the
instruction in Noel had a substantial practical impact on a significant class of aliens.
This conclusion was shared by immigration lawyers who favor public participation
in the making of INS instructions. Whether public participation would have served
a useful purpose in the Noel situation, however, is uncertain. See Comment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 430, supra note 9, at 451-53 (a useful analysis of situations in
which public participation is likely to produce helpful information for the agency),
It is not clear, for example, how much the INS would have benefited from public exposure of the issues underlying the rule, such as the bona fides of marriages
of deportable aliens, the impact of departure extensions on the labor markets, and
the duration of the wait for visas. Certainly it is arguable that public debate would
have been useful because the INS instruction had been the product of political concern over the competition for jobs between citizens and aliens that had been aggravated by a tight labor market. Compare Walter Holm & Co. v. Hardin, 449 F.2d 1009
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (oral argument required in rulemaking because of suspicion that
agency favored domestic over foreign producers), with Consolidated Edison Co. v.
FPC, 512 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FPC's procedure that screened out public
acceptable because its action apparently not favorable to regulated industry),
Other cases involving policy statements in which the legal effect test apparently
was applied are Hunter v. Morton, 529 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1976) (alternative
ground); Yale Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 478 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 414
U.S. 914 (1973); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. FPC, 462 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 941 (1972), revd. on other grounds, 411 U.S. 458
(1973) (semble); Yan Wo Cheng v. Rinaldi, 389 F. Supp. 583 (D.N.J. 1975);
Dirnaren v. INS, 398 F. Supp. 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
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law-declaratory material. 88 One important interpretive technique is
the adoption by an agency of interpretive rules of general applicability. Interpretation also frequently occurs in the course of adjudication and through legislative rulemaking, as well as in less formal
communications such as press releases, internal memoranda, or advice
letters to members of the public. 89
Consciousness of the difference between legislative and interpretive rules began to appear in the literature in the late 1920s.90 Early
administrative law writers had no difficulty making the distinction.
Legislative rules were deemed to be those promulgated pursuant to
a specific statutory delegation of rule-making power. For example,
a statute might prohibit a certain action, if so provided in rules, or
it might permit such action, except as provided in administratively
enacted rules. Rules that were not based on a specific statutory delegation of power were considered interpretive. 91
The writers of the 1941 report of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure shared this understanding. 92
88. See generally M. AsIMOW, .ADVICE TO THE PUBLIC FROM FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 80-82 (1973).
89. Interpretation can also occur through less formal means, such as informal adjudication, negotiation, speechmaking, dispensing of grants, and even the lifting of
the administrative eyebrow.
90. See J. COMER, LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS OF NATIONAL .ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES ch. 5 (1927); F. VOM BAUR, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 475-89
(1942); Alvord, Treasury Regulations and the Whilslzire Oil Case, 40 CoLUM. L.
REV. 252 (1940); Lee, Legislative and Interpretative Regulations, 29 GEO. L.J. 1
(1940).
91. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27; Lee,
supra note 90.
92. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27.
The Committee discussed the legal attributes of interpretive rules:
Most agencies find it useful from time to time to issue interpretations of the statutes under which they operate. These interpretations are ordinarily of an advisory character, indicating merely the meaning of applicable statutory language.
They are not binding upon those affected, for, if there is disagreement with the
agency's view, the question may be presented for determination by a court. But
the agency's interpretations are in any event of considerable importance; customarily they are accepted as determinative by the public at large, and even if they
are challenged in judicial proceedings, the courts will be influenced though not
concluded by the administrative opinion. An agency's interpretations may take
the form of "interpretative rules." More often they are made as a consequence
of individual requests for rulings upon particular questions; but as "rulings" they
are often scattered and not easily accessible.
Id.
While the Committee thus characterized legislative and interpretive rules differently, it was aware that these distinctions are often difficult to preserve in application:
In addition to the power to enact legally binding regulations conferred upon
many of the agencies, all of them may, if they wish, issue interpretations, rulings
or opinions upon the laws they administer, without statutory authorization to do
so. . . . Some agencies which issue interpretations couched in general terms
rather than rulings upon particular facts are careful to distinguish them from
regulations that have the force of law; other agencies simply promulgate their
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However, their discussion also indicated a keen awareness of both the
practical impact of interpretive rules and the deference paid to them
by reviewing courts. The majority of the Committee favored the
publication of all rules in the Federal Register but refrained from recommending specific procedures for rulemaking, partly because of
concern that excessive hearings would be required when they were
not needed. 03 When Congress returned to the task of prescribing
uniform administrative procedures in 1946, it enshrined the difference
between legislative and interpretive rules in the APA, 04 with the
legislative history appearing to suggest an intent to adopt the legal
effect test. 05
interpretations as regulations which are indistinguishable in form from those that
have statutory force.
Administrative rulemaking, in any event, includes the formulation of both legally binding regulations and interpretative regulations. The former receive statutory force upon going into effect. The latter do not receive statutory force and
their validity is subject to challenge in any court proceeding in which their application may be in question. The statutes themselves and not the regulation remain in theory the sole criterion of what the law authorizes or compels and what
it forbids. An interpretative regulation even of long standing will be rejected
if it is deemed to be in conflict with a clear and ambiguous statute.
The distinction between statutory regulations and interpretative regulations
is, however, blurred by the fact that the courts pay great deference to the interpretative regulations of administrative agencies especially where these have been
followed for a long time. . . . Although the courts at times avoid the effect
of this doctrine by refusing to apply administrative interpretations which they
consider inadmissible, the doctrine has sufficient weight to give much finality to
the interpretative regulations of administrative agencies. Consequently, the procedures by which these regulations are prescribed become important to private
interests and will be considered in this report.
Id. at 99-100 (footnotes omitted).
93. Id. at 108. Nevertheless, it strongly approved the various practices of con•
sultation, conferences, and hearings that had developed by 1941. Id. at 103-08. The
Committee recommended that all rules having "statutory effect" have a deferred effective date. Id. at 115. The minority members of the Committee would have required notice and comment procedures for all rules, legislative and interpretive. Id,
at 228. In the legislative hearings that followed submission of the Report to Congress, there was relatively little discussion of the problem of interpretations. The
testimony of Commissioner Healy of the SEC also indicates considerable confusion
on the part of the Committee members. See Hearings, supra note 54, at 330.
94. It created a number of exemptions in addition to the one for nonlegislative
rules. For an excellent critique of some of the other exemptions, see National Wildlife Fedn. v. Snow, 39 Ad. L.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Bonfield, Military and Foreign
Affairs Function Rulemaking Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 71 MICH, L.
REV. 222 (1972); Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to
Public Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540
(1970). The Administrative Conference recommended repeal of these exemptions.
See ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIIE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATIONS 69-8,
73-5 (1976).
95. The Judiciary Committee staff contended that there was no need to require
procedural formalities for the adoption of interpretive rules since these are subject
to plenary judicial review, whereas substantive rules are accorded maximum deference. See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18. During the Senate debate, Senator McCarran stated that there was no need for any special provision for
interpretations since they are "merely adaptations [or] interpretations of statutes"
and subject to a more intensive judicial review." Id. at 313.
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Many judicial decisions have since weighed claims that the public
should be allowed to participate in the formulation of rules that the
agency asserts are interpretive under section 4 of the APA. Some
of these cases involve agency interpretations of statutes, while others
involve interpretations of prior rules. The cases that utilize the legal
effect standard analyze the rule to determine whether it creates, by
its own force, a legally binding standard of conduct. Highly relevant
in this inquiry, of course, is the agency's chosen label.
A frequently cited case of this type is American President Lines,
Ltd. v. Federal Maritime Commission. 96 According to the federal
Shipping Act,97 carriers can form a conference to establish uniform
rates on the shipment of particular items. To deal with competition
from nonparticipating carriers, the conference would "open" the rate
on a particular item to competition. After a period of time, it would
"close" the rate, thereby restoring uniformity. However, section 14b
of the Shipping Act98 posed a problem: If a conference "terminated"
a contract rate system, it had to give ninety days notice of such action
and could not reinstitute the rate without permission from the Federal
Maritime Commission (FMC).
The FMC, without public participation, adopted a rule construing
section 14b. The rule provided that the temporary "opening" of
a rate was a "termination" under the Act that required ninety
days notice, and that the "opened" rate could not be closed again
without the FMC's permission. Carriers claimed the rule was invalid because the agency had failed to comply with section 4 procedures. In an opinion by Judge (now Chief Justice) Burger, the
District of Columbia Circuit had little difficulty in characterizing the
rule as interpretive, largely deferring to the label affixed by the agency.
The court found persuasive the fact that the FMC had treated the
rule as interpretive by denying that the rule had any "independent
binding effect on carriers, and [by asserting that] the only
penalties for action contrary to the rule are those penalties which
were applicable before promulgation of the rule and indep~ndent of
the rule, i.e., the penalties provided for violation of the Shipping Act
itself." 99 The court adhered to the legal effect approach even though
A last helpful piece of commentary is the authoritative ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
MANUAL ON TIIE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE Acr, supra note 57, at 30 n.3, which

defines interpretive rules as "rules or statements issued by an agency to advise the
public of the agency's construction of the statutes and rules which it administers."
96. 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
97. 46 u.s.c. §§ 801-842 (1970).
98. 46O.S.C. § 813(a) (1970).
99. 316 F.2d at 421-22. The court also held that the petitioner's objection to the
lack of public participation was moot. 316 F.2d at 421.
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it admitted that the rule would have significant practical impact:
[T]his rule undeniably deals with a matter of great importance to
petitioners' business activities . . . .
. . . Whatever practical or psychological effect this rule may have
on the conduct of petitioners-and we do not doubt that it may
have some pragmatic consequences-its legal effect is essentially that
of an opinion of the legal staff. Neither the affected parties nor the
courts are bound by it unless they elect to adopt it as a correct
interpretation of the statute. 100

Frequently, a rule purports to interpret an earlier one. If the
later rule only clarifies the earlier rule without amending it, no public
participation is required. 101 If, however, the later rule amends the
earlier one, APA rule-making procedures are obligatory. 102 It is
quite difficult to determine whether a prior rule has actually been
amended or merely interpreted. The leading case applying the legal
effect test in this situation is Gibson Wine Co. v. Snyder. 103 At issue
in Gibson Wine was a regulation that required wine derived from
a particular fruit to be designated by the name of that fruit. The
issue concerned boysenberry wine; since the boysenberry is a variety
of blackberry, was boysenberry wine to be labelled as "blackberry
wine" or "boysenberry wine"? After considerable vacillation, the
deputy commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service finally ruled
that it had to be labelled as "boysenberry wine." This ruling was
particularly disadvantageous to bottlers of boysenberry wine, who
protested that wines made from other varieties of blackberries could
be labelled "blackberry wine." Plaintiff argued that this ruling was
an amendment to the existing regulation, thereby requiring public
participation under both the APA and a specific provision of the
Intoxicating Liquor Law .104
The District of Columbia Circuit held that no public participation
was required, since the rule was interpretive rather than legislative.
The court used the legal effect test, remarking that legislative rules
create law whereas interpretive rules state what the administrator
thinks the law means. Since the ruling was merely the agency's
100. 316 F.2d at 421-22. Other cases that employ the legal effect test in analyzing the interpretive rule issue include Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757,
763 n.12 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1974); United States v. 353
Cases, 247 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 834 (1958).
101. If the subsequent rule is only interpretive of the earlier one, the later rule
could be retroactive. See Fleming v. Van Der Loo, 160 F.2d 906, 913 (D.C. Cir.
1947). However, it would be substantively invalid if it was inconsistent with the
earlier rule. See Barron Coop. Creamery v. Wickard, 140 F.2d 485, 488 (7th Cir.
1944).
102. Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1974).
103. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952), noted in 1 J. PUB. L. 491 (1952).
104. 27 u.s.c. § 205(f) (1970).
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opinion as to the meaning of an existing regulation, it was held to
be interpretive in nature. The court observed that interpretations
receive a more intensive degree of judicial scrutiny than legislative
rules, noted that the lower court had provided plenary review, and
affirmed its holding that the interpretation was substantively correct.105
Judge Miller, in dissent, argued that the prior regulation was
completely changed by the subsequent ruling. Previously all wine
made from varieties of blackberry was permitted to be labelled blackberry wine; now the agency had created a special category for one
"large and luscious" variety. He felt that this ruling could not be
interpretive because the earlier rule was clear and did not need any
interpretation. He added that the ruling had the force and effect
of Iaw100 and also seemed to feel that due process considerations
were involved. 107
B.

The Substantial Impact Test

In sharp contrast to the cases that distinguish between legislative
and nonlegislative rules according to their legal effect are cases
that consider the pragmatic effect of the rule determinative. It is
not always clear from these cases whether the courts are rejecting
the legal effect test as a definitional tool, or whether they accept it
but require that notice and comment procedures be employed in the
interest of fairness. Although the substantial impact cases are
responsive to the public's need to participate in rulemaking, they furnish little predictable guidance to an agency that must decide what
procedures to employ. In addition, the courts using the test have
failed to explain how it is consistent with the language of section

4.
105. See 194 F.2d 332-33.
106. See 194 F.2d at 335 (Miller, J., dissenting). Presumably, Judge Miller
meant that the subsequent rule was legislative, and, therefore, by definition, it bad
the force of law. It is also possible that he meant that the ruling had the force of
law in a practical sense, since the sanctions for violations were sufficiently severe
to induce compliance. If so, his opinion is a precursor of the substantial impact test
that emerged twenty years later.
107. See 194 F.2d at 336 (Miller, J., dissenting). Other cases that classify subsequent regulations as interpretive, largely by reference to the agency's label, are
Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455 (Erner. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991
(1975) (dictum); Shell Oil Co. v. FPC, 491 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); National
Assn. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Garelick Mfg. Co. v. Dillon, 313 F.2d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1963);
Mitchell v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 964 (1955); National Restaurant Assn. v. Simon, 411 F. Supp. 993 (D.D.C.
1976). But see Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1974) (subsequent regulation classified as legislative despite its label, since it changed obligations of a regulated company).
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Policy Statements

The foundation of the substantial impact test was laid in Texaco,
Inc. v. FPC,1° 8 in which the court's discussion of policy statements
was tangential to its holding. In that case, suit was brought to challenge a Federal Power Commission (FPC) regulation amended
without public participation to require compound interest rather than
simple interest on refunds. To justify its lack of public procedures,
the FPC first relied on the APA provision that permits an agency
to dispense with notice and comment procedures if they are "unnecessary,"100 but the court held this exemption was inapplicable. As
an apparent afterthought, the agency tried to characterize its rule
as a policy statement. This position was doomed to defeat since the
agency's own conduct was inconsistent with it. 110 In analyzing this
claim, the court first defined a policy statement in traditional termsas "one that does not impose any rights and obligations on an operator."111 Using this test, the court held that the amendment was not
a policy statement since it imposed a new obligation for the payment
of compound interest on refunds, one which an operator would have
the burden of proving should not apply in any waiver or similar proceeding.112
It was, however, the ensuing discussion of the values of public
participation in rulemaking that was seized upon by subsequent
courts. According to the court, notice and comment procedures give
the public an opportunity to participate and enable the agency to
educate itself "before establishing rules and procedures which have
a substantial impact on those regulated."113 But the Texaco court
108. 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969).
109. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(B) (1970) ("when the agency for good cause
finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief statement of reasons therefor in the
rules issued) that notice and public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary,
or contrary to the public interest").
110. The regulation was not placed with the agency's interpretations and policy
statements in the Code of Federal Regulations. The agency had never relied on the
policy statement exception, and the court felt that its review power was limited to
testing the validity of the theory used by the agency. See 412 F.2d at 744 nn.8 &
9. Moreover, the compound interest rule seemingly was not a policy statement, since
it did not relate to a discretionary function. It would have been more plausible to
characterize it as an interpretive rule, since it explains the meaning of the word "interest" in section 4(e) of the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. § 717c(e) (1970).
111. 412 F.2d at 744.
112. See 412 F.2d at 743-44. The court apparently felt that a new obligation
was imposed by reason of a shift of the burden of proof. 'See text at notes 65-69
supra.
113. 412 F.2d at 744 (emphasis added). The court apparently drew support from
National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90, 95 (D.D.C.
1967) (three-judge court), affd. per curiam, 393 U.S. 18 (1968), which referred to the
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did not use the substantial impact test to determine that the
compound interest rule was not a policy statement. Instead, the phrase was dropped in connection with a general treatment of the
importance of public participation in rulemaking.
The substantial impact analysis was elevated from dictum to doctrine in Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor.11 4 In order to issue a
visa for permanent residence, the Secretary of Labor must certify
that there is a shortage of domestic workers in the alien's trade and
that his admission will not adversely affect the wages and working
conditions of similarly employed American workers. To simplify the
determinations involved, the Secretary published Schedule C, which
listed occupations for which labor was in short supply and which was
to be reviewed continuously. Aliens in the trades listed in Schedule
C could be "precertified," meaning that they were excused from
having to submit a specific job offer to receive a visa. Various
versions of Schedule C were adopted with public participation under
the APA, but the schedule was revoked by a directive on February
9, 1970, without any public participation. Plaintiffs were persons
who had been precertified under the prior procedure, but whose
visas had not yet been granted. In order to retain their priority after
Schedule C was revoked, plaintiffs had to submit specific job offers;
since they failed to do so, their labor certification was revoked.
The court had no difficulty characterizing the Secretary's directive as a rule rather than "a fact determination regarding the domestic
labor market," as the district court had found. 115 The Secretary then
argued that the rule was procedural, interpretive, or a policy statement, and therefore exempt from APA rule-making procedures. The
court noted that labels were not conclusive and applied the same test
to all three claims:
[The rule] changed existing rights and obligations by requiring aliens
of the class of appellants to submit proof of specific job offers as
well as a statement of their qualifications; it thereby made it more
difficult for employers to fill vacancies in the occupations no longer
precertified. By virtue of this substantial impact both upon the
aliens and the employers, notice and opportunity for comment by
the public should first be provided. 116
impact of a rule in deciding whether it fell within the APA exception for procedural
rules.
114. 469 F.2d 478 (2d Cir. 1972). Judge Hays dissented without a written
opinion.
115. See 479 F.2d at 481, quoting 337 F. Supp. 1289, 1294 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
The court held that the directive fit the definition of a rule in the APA as "an
agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to
implement. .. law or policy...." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (1970).
116. 469 F.2d at 482 (emphasis added). The court relied on Texaco, cases con-
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It is not at all clear from this language whether the court found the
rule procedurally invalid under the legal effect test, or whether it
rejected the legal effect test in favor of the substantial impact test
and found the rule invalid under the latter.
The confusion in the Second Circuit's decision is particularly
striking when compared to the carefully reasoned decision of the district court. 117 The district judge pointed out that, while precertification at the time of application for the visa was a convenient procedure, the statute requires an analysis of the American labor market
at the time of the alien's admission. Since the Secretary had no
power to guarantee admission through precertification, the procedure could be considered a policy statement, a practice without legal
effect, or an invalid legislative rule, any of which could be revoked
without public participation.
The decision of the Second Circuit took an entirely different
tack. It observed that the directive changed existing rights and obligations. This could not be correct, however, since, as the district
court had shown, precertified aliens had no legal right to admission
and the Secretary had no obligations toward them. Evidently, therefore, the court of appeals was concerned less with legally defined rights
and obligations than with the practical effect of the revocation on the
interests of both employers and alien employees. The Secretary had
definitively terminated an advantageous status involving a substantial
class of persons. Under the prior practice, precertified alien employees were protected from the burden of having to obtain and prove a
specific job offer, both at the time of application for a visa and at the
time of admission. Now they were no longer protected. Whether
Schedule C and its revocation ever created or abolished any legal rights
or obligations was obviously not determinative.
Lewis-Mota is well worth comparing with Noel v. Chapman, decided by a different panel of the Second Circuit in 1975, which also
involved discretionary immigration determinations.U 8 The Noel
panel recognized the existence of the "substantial impact" test, but,
quoting Lewis-Mota, it remarked that "ordinarily" the only rules that
have a substantial impact are those that change "existing rights and
obligations." 119 As we have seen, however, the rule in Lewis-Mota
did not affect legal rights and obligations; rather it changed a status
struing the procedural exemption, and Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, discussed in
text at notes 133-38, which involved interpretive rules.
117. 337 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
118. See text at notes 82-87 supra.
119. 508 F.2d at 1030, quoting Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor, 469 F.2d at
482.
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of great practical importance. The instruction in Noel, which prevented the routine extension of deportation for a particular class of
deportable aliens, operated in a like fashion. Thus, the two rules
had similar practical effect, and those two Second Circuit immigration
decisions appear to be sharply inconsistent.
The substantial impact test was forthrightly adopted by a panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit in Pickus v. United States Board
of Parole. 120 The parole board adopted rules concerning the criteria
to be considered in granting parole. 121 Later it formulated more
specific guidelines that prescribed the number of months customarily
to be served before release, depending on the severity of the crime
and the characteristics of the offender. 122 Although the rules and
the guidelines were published in the Federal Register, they were
adopted without public participation.
After finding that the Board of Parole is an agency covered by
the APA,1 23 the court held that neither the rules nor the guidelines
could be treated as policy statements. Consequently, both were
invalid.124 The court registered its agreement with "several courts
[that] have ruled that agency action cannot be a general statement of policy if it substantially affects the right of persons subject
to agency regulations . . . . [The] outer boundary of the general
policy exemption derives from congressional purpose in enacting
section 4-that the interested public should have an opportunity to
participate, and the agency should be fully informed, before rules
having such substantial impact are promulgated."125 Although the
120. 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Accord, Ramer v. Saxbe, 522 F.2d 695
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (Bureau of Prisons). See Pickus v. United States Bd. of Parole,
543 F.2d 240 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (subsequent decision denying prisoners right to comment orally on the rules).
121. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20 (1975).
122. 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.18-.19 (1975). See generally Project, supra note 3.
123. 507 F.2d at 111-12. According to staff of the Board of Parole, the Board's
reason for contesting the Pickus case was its concern over whether the Board should
be classified as an agency under the APA. It feared that an unfavorable precedent
on this point might result in exposure of its quasi-judicial functions to the adjudica•
tion provisions of the APA. The Board was relatively unconcerned with whether the
rule-making requirements of the APA were applicable to it. It has had little diffi.
culty in complying with the Pickus decision.
124. See 507 F.2d at 1114. The court declared that this holding was not retroactive. Therefore, invalidly adopted regulations were allowed to determine the parole
status of many prisoners. But see Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S.
607 ( 1944), discussed in note 237 infra and accompanying text.
125. 507 F.2d at 1112. The court relied on Texaco and Lewis-Mota, as well as
on cases construing the procedural exemption. See National Motor Freight Traffic
Assn. v. United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), affd., 393
U.S. 18 (1968); Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.
C. 1964).
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court spoke of "the rights of persons," the balance of its opinion
made clear that it was speaking not of "rights" in the strict sense,
for no prisoner has a "right" to parole, but rather of a "substantial effect on ultimate parole decisions," 126 or "significant consequences. "127
If the court had chosen to do so, it could easily have followed
the traditional analysis of cases like Pacific Gas & Electric128 to characterize both the rules and the guidelines as policy statements:
( 1) the rules did not set forth a standard that the public
must obey;
(2) the agency generally labelled them as policy statements
and guidelines, although sometimes they were called rules;
(3) the orders used many tentative words and appeared to be
temporary in duration;
( 4) they were directed at the agency staff, not at the public;
and
( 5) aggrieved persons could try to persuade decisionmakers
not to apply the rules in, particular cases.
It seems clear that the Pickus decision squarely rejects the traditional legal effect test; instead, it distinguishes between legislative
rules and policy statements by analyzing the practical effect of the
rule. 129 Under this approach, if the public should have been involved
in the formulation of the rule, it follows that the rule is to be deemed
legislative.
The Pickus decision reached a sound result. The rules and
guidelines enunciated by the United States Board of Parole had indeed sharply altered the discretionary powers of parole board decisionmakers. Considering the Board's massive caseload, the rules
will, in effect, be dispositive in the great majority of cases. It
follows that prisoners and other members of the public should have
been involved in their promulgation. However, the reasoning of
Pickus is open to serious criticisms. Most importantly, the court
overlooked the fundamental point that the parole board had no
legislative rule-making power.13 ° Consequently, its rules and guide126. 507 F.2d at 1112-13.
127. 507 F.2d at 1113.
128. Pacific Ga.9 & Electric, decided only four months before by a different panel
of the D.C. Circuit, is discussed in text at notes 65-81 supra.
129. Other decisions have applied substantial impact analysis to rules that the
agency sought to characterize as policy statements. See, e.g., Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, 1204 n.5 (D.D. Cir. 1971) (dictum); Nader
v. Butterfield, 373 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1974) (FAA memorandum permitting
x-ray checks of baggage).
130. See K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 150-54; Koch, supra note 9, at 1065, Both
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lines could not be legislative rules. Moreover, the court simply
failed to explain how its decision could be reconciled with the legislative history of section 4 of the APA, which seems to embrace the
legal effect test. 131 As will be explained later in this article, the
sound result in Pickus could have been achieved without doing violence to the statute.132

2.

Interpretive Rules

An influential case applying the substantial impact test to a rule
that interpreted a statute is Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association v. Finch, 133 decided in 1970. The 1962 amendments to the.
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act134 require that manufacturers establish by "substantial evidence" the "effectiveness" both of new drugs
and of those marketed between 1938 and 1962. The statute defines
substantial evidence to mean "adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts qualified by
scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the
drug involved. . . ."135
In 1969, without public participation, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) adopted a regulation136 that purported to interpret the language of this statute. In addition to prescribing criteria
for "adequate and well-controlled clinical investigations," the rule
provided that other clinical tests and documented clinical experience
were irrelevant. Moreover, the affected drug company would be entitled to a hearing only if it demonstrated in advance a likelihood
that it could produce substantial evidence of the drug's effectiveness.
Plaintiff brought an action contending that the rule was invalid
because of the agency's failure to provide preadoption notice and
comment procedures. The FDA argued that the rule was both interpretive and procedural, but the court effectively disposed of both
contentions. Refusing to be bound by the agency's labels, the court
noted that the underlying policy of section 4 "at least requires that
when a proposed regulation of general applicability has a substantial
impact on the regulated industry, or an important class of the memauthors further criticize Pickus for applying the standard of judicial review applicable
to legislative rules.
131. See text at notes 52-58, 90-95 supra.
132. See text at notes 174-76 infra.
133. 307 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1970).
134. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act §§ 505(d)-(e), 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(d)(e) (1970).
135. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1970).
136. 34 Fed. Reg. 14,596 (1969).
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bers or the products of that industry, notice and opportunity for comment should first be provided."137 The court then analyzed in detail
the immediate and substantial impact of the regulation on the drug
industry and found that:
( 1) the regulations were pervasive in scope, applying to thousands of drugs;
(2) the regulations had a retroactive effect since they threatened drugs already on the market;
( 3) the FDA's position substantially narrowed its previous,
more flexible stance on the issue, and thus it represented an important
change in position; and
( 4) the regulation caused substantial confusion in the industry, was extremely complex, and was intensely controversial. 138
The substantial impact test has also been applied to rules that
purport to interpret previously adopted rules. These decisions depart sharply from the legal effect test embraced in the Gibson Wine
case discussed earlier. 139 One such case is the Eighth Circuit decision in American Bancorporation v. Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System. 140 The Bank Holding Company Act prohibits a bank holding company from acquiring an interest in a nonbanking organization uniess the Federal Reserve Board determines
that the new business is "so closely related to banking . . . as to
be a proper incident thereof." 141 A regulation, adopted after notice
137. 307 F. Supp. at 863. The court relied on Texaco, see text at notes 10813 supra, which primarily involved the "unnecessary" exemption, as well as cases in•
volving the "procedure" exemption, e.g., National Motor Freight Traffic Assn. v.
United States, 268 F. Supp. 90 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court), affd., 393 U.S. 18
(1968) (per curiam). Similar exemption cases, also cited by the court, are NLRB
v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) ("procedure" exemption), and Seaboard World Airlines v. Gronouski, 230 F. Supp. 44 (D.D.C. 1964) ("agency man•
agement" exception).
Professors Koch and Davis read Pharmaceutical Manufacturers as requiring additional rule-making procedures because of a perceived need for fairness, as distinguished
from constituting a reclassification of the rules as legislative. See K. DAVIS, supra note
9, at 196-97; Koch, supra note 9, at 1062. The language employed by the court is
vague and is fairly susceptible to either reading. However, as Koch concedes, the
court did rely on National Motor Freight, which clearly used the substantial impact
test.
138. See 307 F. Supp. at 864-66. Other cases that utilize substantial impact an•
alysis to decide whether a rule is interpretive are Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor,
discussed in text at notes 114-19 supra; Cattle Feeders Tax Comm. v. Shultz, 74•
1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 83,067 (W.D. Okla), revd. on other grounds, 504 F.2d 462 (10th
Cir. 1974).
139. See text at notes 103-07 supra.
140. 509 F.2d 29 (8th Cir. 1974). See Note, supra note 9.
141. Bank Holding Company Act § 4(c)(8), 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (c)(8) (1970).
For another case in which a second regulation interpreted an earlier one under this
statutory scheme, see National Assn. of Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Board of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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and comment, listed certain activities that the Board considered
closely related to banking. A provision of that regulation permitted
a holding company to act "as investment or financial adviser, including (i) serving as the advisory company for a mortgage or a real
estate investment trust, and (ii) furnishing economic or financial information. " 142
Northwest Bancorporation (Banco) applied for permission to acquire a firm that specialized in advising state and local governments
on financial matters. After the application was filed, the Board
amended its regulation without public participation to allow holding
companies to act "as investment or financial adviser to the extent
of . . . providing financial advice to state and local govemments." 143
Relying on the amended rule, the Board approved Banco's application.
The Eighth Circuit found the adoption of the second rule valid
since it had no substantial impact on the competitors of Banco. The
court's major reason for this conclusion was that, by substituting the
language "to the extent of' for "including," the second rule had
narrowed the original regulation, thereby making it more difficult
for bank holding companies to expand. Additionally, the court
pointed out that the entire subject matter had been fully canvassed
in the initial rule-making hearings. Under the analysis first suggested in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, the second regulation
seemed neither complex nor pervasive, did not drastically change
existing law, seemed to cause no confusion or controversy, and had
no significant retroactive effect. 144
C.

The Tests Clash: Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights

The divergent streams of analysis exemplified by the legal effect
and substantial impact tests finally intersected in Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 145 resulting in a six to three
split in the District of Columbia Circuit. The case involved an attack
on the validity of Revenue Ruling 69-545, 146 which interpreted the
142. 36 Fed. Reg. 10,777 (1971) (emphasis added).
143. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (5) (1976) (emphasis added).
144. An additional portion of the opinion remanded the case for a trial-type hearing on adjudicatory facts involved in Banco's application.
Other cases that apply substantial impact analysis to determine whether a second
regulation is interpretive or legislative are Continental Oil Co. v. Burns, 317 F. Supp.
194 (D. Del. 1970); Anderson v. Butz, 37 Ad. L.2d 852 (E.D. Cal. 1975).
145. 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917
(1976). The Supreme Court held that the complaint should have been dismissed because the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue.
146, 1969-2 C.B. 117.
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word "charitable" in a tax provision147 exempting charitable organizations from income tax. In this ruling, the IRS reversed itself, expressly abrogating an earlier ruling148 that had conditioned the taxexempt status of a private hospital on its provision of free or belowcost medical treatment to indigents. As is customary for published
rulings, the IRS did not provide for public notice and comment for
either ruling. 140 The district court upheld the plaintiffs substantive
attack on the second ruling, 150 without reaching the issue of whether
it was invalid under the APA for lack of public participation. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the ruling was not
co.ntrary to congressional intent. It also disagreed with plaintiff's
procedural argument. Adopting the traditional legal effect test, the
majority concluded that the ruling was interpretive and that notice
and comment procedures were not required. Because the rule interpreted the meaning of the word "charitable" in the statute, the court
was not bound by the ruling, although it might choose to accept the
ruling as a proper interpretation.151
In a footnote, the court confronted the substantial impact test.
It recognized the impact of the ruling on the poor, the Service's lack
of expertise concerning the problem of medical care delivery, and
the Service's sharp reversal of position, but concluded: "[W]hile
these factors have been considered by the courts with respect to
whether notice and hearing are required by the APA, they are not
determinative here where a ruling is clearly interpretative in nature
and has no legally binding effect."152 This footnote is disingenuous;
the cases relying on the substantial impact test used it even though
a rule was clearly interpretive of words in a statute or regulation and
even though it had no legally binding effect.158 Thus, the majority
did not distinguish the substantial impact test but rather squarely rejected it.
In dissent on this point, Judge Wright observed that, while the
ruling portended a substantial change in the availability of hospital
services for the poor, neither the poor nor anyone else was given
147. I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3).
148. Rev. Ru!. 56-185, 1956-1 C.B. 202.
149. However, the IRS has recently invited public comment and provided for deferred effectiveness in regard to a proposed revenue procedure. Announcement 7542, 1975-19 I.R.B. 138. Revenue procedures relate to IRS policy and discretion or
provide procedural instructions, while revenue rulings interpret the tax code.
150. See 370 F. Supp. 325 (D.D.C. 1973).
151. See 506 F.2d at 1290. The court relied on Gibson Wine, discussed in text
at notes 103-07 supra.
152. 506 F.2d at 1291 n.30.
153. See text at notes 133-44 supra.
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notice or allowed to comment. He pointed out that the IRS is not
expert in health care delivery problems and that, consequently, experts in this field should have assisted the IRS in reaching an informed decision whether to relax the obligations of private hospitals
to the poor. 154
Rehearing en bane was denied, although Judges Wright and
Robinson and Chief Judge Bazelon voted for it. Chief Judge BazeIon's brief opinion pungently criticized the use of the legal effect test,
since the majority had failed to make a de novo examination of the
substantive issues involved but had merely deferred to the agency.
Ashe put it,
[T]he majority tells the plaintiffs that it will not be bound by the
[IRS] interpretation of the term "charitable" and then turns right

around and upholds the Service interpretation as a permissible exercise of discretion on the basis of factual assumptions which are not
supported by a record and which plaintiffs have not had an opportunity to rebut. 155

The majority probably was correct in characterizing the ruling
as an interpretive rule under traditional legal effect analysis. IRS
rulings make no definitive changes in the tax law; they have always
been treated by the agency as interpretive and courts often grant
them remarkably little deference. 156 In one important respect, however, a ruling like Revenue Ruling 69-545 is different from most revenue rulings. Generally, a ruling unfavorable to taxpayers is unlikely to have any legal effect, and taxpayers have ample opportunity
to challenge it before the agency as well as the courts. But Revenue
Ruling 69-545 is favorable to the taxpayer and unfavorable to poor
persons needing hospital services. Those adversely affected will
have no opportunity to persuade the IRS that its ruling was incorrect,
for there will be no subsequent administrative proceedings, since
they are not adversely affected as taxpayers. Indeed, in its decision
in Eastern Kentucky, the Supreme Court held that the poor persons
challenging the ruling lacked standing to obtain judicial review.
Under these circumstances, it could be argued that a revenue ruling
that will not be subject to any further administrative proceedings
might have sufficient legal effect to be characterized as a legislative
rule.
154. See 506 F.2d at 1291-92.
155. 506 F.2d at 1293 (footnotes omitted).
156. See, e.g., Stubbs, Overbeck & Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142
(5th Cir. 1971); Grace E. Lang, 64 T.C. 404 (1975). For a case according some
deference to revenue rulings, see Gino v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 833 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 490 (1976). See Comment, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 1135, supra note
9, at 1140 n.34
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If substantial impact is the test, however, it would be difficult
to find a clearer case in which public participation should be mandatory.157 The Service's ruling apparently had a profound effect on
the availability of health care for poor people, it amounted to a
complete reversal of the Service's previous position, the matter was
highly controversial, and the IRS was functioning in an area where
it had no expertise.

D.

A Critique of Present Case Law

As we have seen, the courts have fashioned two dissimilar
methods of determining if the agency must give notice and invite
comments before adopting what the agency considers to be an interpretive rule or a policy statement. The legal effect approach generally yields more predictable results and is more solidly grounded in
the APA. The substantial impact test is more responsive to the
public's need to participate in the formulation of important rules, but
it is rather unpredictable and lacks an adequate statutory basis.
Although the legal effect test usually furnishes predictable results, this is not always so. 158 Many policy statements, for example,
arguably have legal effect -because they confer or withdraw a "privilege" or an "immunity."159 If a policy statement assures a favorable or unfavorable exercise of agency discretion, does it not confer
or withdraw a privilege or an immunity? If so, it would seem to
have the requisite legal effect and thus should properly be treated
as a legislative rule. Moreover, the other factors sometimes used
in applying the legal effect test are not particularly helpful. Distinctions based on tentativeness or temporariness are elusive, and a
rule might be addressed either to the staff or to the public without
any real difference in impact. 16° Furthermore, it is difficult to clas157. One impact of the ruling was that it aborted congressional consideration of
the issue. See 506 F.2d at 1289.
158. For example, even if the traditional legal effect test is adopted, it is difficult
to determine how the FCC's 1970 policy statement on license renewal criteria should
be classified. Although labelled as a policy statement, it appeared to work a definitive and permanent change in renewal proceedings. Similarly, the policy statement on children's television appears to impose new obligations on licensees. See
39 Fed. Reg. 39,395 (1974).
159. See 1 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1976).
160. Many discretionary rules can be directed to either the staff or the public.
For example, many of the policy statements of the CAB are directed to airlines or
cities but could just as easily have been addressed to the staff. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R.
§§ 399.11, 399.45, 399.80 (1976). The FPC rule involved in Pacific Gas & Electric,
see text at notes 65-81 supra, which set priorities for natural gas allocations, could
easily have been an instruction addressed to pipeline companies on how to allocate
the gas. It could also have been a directive to the staff concerning the acceptance
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sify a rule by making judgments about the adequacy of subsequent
administrative redress.
Similarly, it is frequently difficult to decide whether a rule that
construes particular statutory language is interpretive or legislative.101 As will be discussed more completely in the next section
of this article, 162 generalized rule-making power in the statute is
sufficient to confer the aJ.Ithority to adopt legislative rules. Moreover, the agency may have neglected to label the rule, and it may
not be clear whether the agency views the rule as binding on the
public. Interpretive rules are usually neither tentative nor temporary. Finally, even if their effect on regulated parties is subject to
a probably illusory administrative reconsideration, their effect on
others, such as consumers or competitors, may be definitive and virtually unreviewable. 163
In situations where a rule interprets a prior rule, there is no intelligible way to ascertain whether the prior rule has been amended
or only modified. Of course, if the two are wildly inconsistent, it
is fairly obvious that the second rule was an amendment. More typically, however, the second rule introduces new and perhaps unexpected classifications, distinctions, or emphases in the first rule. 164
Whether the first rule has been changed or only interpreted cannot
be determined in a principled manner.
Moreover, the traditional test relies to an unacceptable degree
on the label used by the agency. Yet that label might have been
chosen precisely for the purpose of avoiding public participation,
permitting retroactivity, 165 or discouraging preenforcement judicial
review. 100 We have been cautioned not to place excessive reliance
on labels, 167 and that warning is particularly appropriate when the
of filings. By the same token, many legislative rules relating to discretionary matters
seemingly could have been written as instructions to staff rather than to the public.
See, e.g., Johnson's Professional Nursing Home v. Weinberger, 490 F.2d 841 (5th
Cir. 1974).
161. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. 20,723 (1974) (FCC notice respecting access by
political candidates to prime time); Baird, Prospective Interpretative Rule-Making by
the SEC, 25 Bus. L. 1581, 1603-09 (1970).
162. See text at notes 178-91 infra.
163. The rule in Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights was of this nature. See Independent
Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 140 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 828 (1971).
164. See Yellow Transit Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 465
(N.D. Tex. 1963) (three-judge court) (judges disagreed sharply over whether the
second rule constituted an amendment or merely an interpretation of the prior rule).
165. See text at notes 233-53 infra.
166. See text at notes 192-218 infra.
167. E.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407 (1942); Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132, 140-41 (D.C. Cir.),
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issue is the opportunity for those affected by the rule to contribute
to its formulation. 168
Unlike the traditional analysis, the substantial impact test is attentive to the need for public participation. Its approach is straightforward: the public should participate in the making of rules that
have a substantial impact on its interests. It does not matter whether
the interest damaged or enhanced is a legal right or obligation; it
could be a status, an expectation, or a business or personal practice
or relationship.
· However, the substantial impact test suffers from the serious
defect of unpredictability of result. 1O0 Much depends upon the
strength of a plaintiffs claim that the rule has a substantial impact
on himself and others similarly situated. Also significant is the court's
intuition as to whether the litigant is playing an obstructionist role or
can make a worthwhile contribution in the formulation of the rule.
Some courts have employed a collection of factors in determining
the substantiality of the impact of a rule, such as the rule's complexity, the pervasiveness of its impact, the degree of controversy surrounding it, the seriousness of its retroactive effect, 170 the abruptness
of change in the agency's position, or the agency's need for instruction and guidance. Each of these factors is vague and can be readily
manipulated. 171
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971); Bristol-Myers Co. v. FfC, 424 F.2d 935, 939
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). As Chief Justice Warren once wrote,
"[h]ow simple would be the tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally
if specific problems could be solved by inspection of labels pasted on them!" Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958). But see K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 148.
168. For example, all of the rules adopted by agencies that have no rule-making
power, such as the EEOC, are, by definition, interpretive or policy statements. The
public is never entitled to participate in any of the rulemaking of these agencies, no
matter how critical the rules are in implementing the statutory scheme.
169. Professor Koch suggests that courts might require agencies to use whatever
pre- or postadoption procedures the court finds appropriate in the interests of fairness.
See Koch, supra note 9, at 1066-68. In my view, this proposal magnifies the unpredictability of the substantial impact test. It is probably better to require the agencies
to observe the section 4 procedures, rather than a tailor-made procedure, if its nonlegislative rules have a substantial impact.
170. If a rule is more likely to be legislative if it has retroactive effect, an interesting anomaly is presented. Generally, under the traditional analysis, interpretive
rules were retroactive and legislative rules were prospective. See text at notes 23353 infra. Thus a retroactive rule is likely to be classed as interpretive by a court
using traditional analysis but as legislative by a court using substantial impact analysis.
171. A recent commentary attempts to synthesize the factors that a court should
consider in assessing substantial impact. See Comment, 43 U. CHI. L. REV, 430,
supra, note 9. The author focuses on the need to protect outsiders, the extent to
which they will have subsequent opportunities to challenge the rule, the extent to
which the agency could utilize public input, and considerations of administrative ef-
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The substantial impact test also contains a flaw considerably more
fundamental than unpredictability. The cases applying the test have
utterly failed to explain how it is consistent with section 4 of the
APA. The history of the nonlegislative rule exemption of the APA
indicates that Congress shared the understanding of contemporaneous commentary172 that drew the distinction in terms of legal effect. The difference between legislative rules on the one hand and
interpretive rules and policy statements on the other was well understood in 1946. Whether a rule was legislative depended upon
whether it was binding on the public, not upon its practical effect.
Unfortunately, the decisions that define non-legislative rules by an
assessment of their impact on the public have supplied no analysis of
the consistency of that test with the APA. As a consequence, the
substantial impact test, in its present form, seems an unlikely candidate to survive Supreme Court review. 173
Nevertheless, the legislative history of the nonlegislative rule
exemption does supply a solid foundation for use of the substantial
impact test as a method of assuring fair procedures rather than as
a definitional tool. It admonishes the agencies that they were not
precluded from using notice and comment procedures and emphasizes that, on the contrary, they could utilize such procedures at their
discretion. As the Senate Judiciary Committee noted:
Agencies are given discretion to dispense with notice ( and consequently with public proceedings) in the case of interpretative rules,
general statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice. This does not mean, however, that agencies
should not-where useful to them or helpful to the public-undertake public procedures in connection with such rule-making. 174
This legislative history provides fertile soil in which the substan-

tial impact test could take root. It suggests that an agency should
not treat all of its nonlegislative rules alike. Instead, it should decide
in each case whether public participation is desirable. Such particificiency. However, the vagueness of these factors diminishes the usefulness of this analysis.
172. See notes 52-58 and 90-95 supra and accompanying text.
173. See K DAVIS, supra note 9, at 193-95; Koch, supra note 9. Both Professors
Koch and Davis criticize the substantial impact text as a definitional tool. An interpretive ru1e or policy statement that has a substantial impact does not become a legi~lative rule for that reason. But both authors agree with the results of the substantial
impact cases, viewing them as attempts by courts to impose extra-statutory procedural
requirements on the agencies in the interests of fairness. Koch argues that the courts
should desigr~ an appropriate procedure tailor-made for each case. See Koch, supra
at 1065-67. In addition, see Independent Broker Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442
F.2d 132, 144 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971).
174. °See APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 187.
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pation would be particularly appropriate when the agency staff
knows, or has reason to know, that the procedures might significantly
protect the public and educate the agency. In short, preadoption
procedures should be used whenever the rule would have a substantial impact upon an appreciable segment of the public. 175 If the
agency failed to provide notice and comment procedures, despite the
fact the rule would have a substantial impact on the public, a court
could readily find the omission reversible error. Its holding would
not be that the rule was legislative despite its lack of legal effect
but rather that the agency's chosen rule-making procedure amounted
to an abuse of discretion. This abuse could be rectified by the courts
in the same way they correct other reviewable abuses of discretionthat is, by identifying the abuse and creating an appropriate remedy.
The remedy could include abrogating the rule until notice and comment procedures have been observed, or leaving it in effect and requiring postadoption procedures. 176
In many situations, it would not be an abuse of discretion for
the agency to omit preadoption procedures even though the rule
would have a substantial impact on the public. For example, emergency conditions might require immediate action. Even if the rule
were legislative, the agency could appropriately dispense with the
section 553 procedure by making a "good cause" finding that they
were "unnecessary, impracticable, or contrary to the public interest."177 In such situations, the reviewing court would surely hold
that the omission of these procedures was not an abuse of discretion.
ill.

BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN INTERPRETIVE
AND LEGISLATIVE RULES

As we have seen, the APA rule-making provisions require t7nat

courts and agencies draw a sharp distinction between interpretive
and legislative rules. According to traditional theory, this distinr.:tion
175. Recommendation 76-5, adopted by the Administrative Conference of the
United States on December 9-10, 1975, is in agreement with this position. For the
text of this and other suggestions in Recommendation 76-5, see note 266 infra.
176. Cf. National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC,
502 F.2d 249 (2d Cir. 1974), in which an FCC legislative rule providing for an
eight-month pre-effectiveness period was held arbitrary and unreasonable. A longer
pre-effectiveness period was required, even though the APA only sets forth a minimum period of 30 days. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1970). Similarly, it might be
argued that, although the APA exemptions generally allow interpretive rules and
policy statements to be adopted without any public participation, the absence of such
procedures would be arbitrary and unreasonable when a rule is likely to have a substantial impact.
111. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B) (1970).
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is easily made and has a number of significant consequences. But
recent developments of fundamental significance in administrative
law have begun to make the distinction more difficult to draw and
increasingly irrelevant. These developments parallel, and seem consistent with, the cases that have required agencies to provide notice
and comment procedures before adopting interpretive rules that
have a substantial impact.

A.

The Power To Make Legislative Rules

The expansion of agency power to promulgate legislative rules
is a development of extraordinary importance in administrative law.
It has left in utter shambles the comfortable notion178 that interpretive and legislative rules are easy to distinguish by examination of
an agency's rule-making power. The traditional view was that a
legislative rule could be adopted only pursuant to a specific statutory
delegation of authority. Rules made pursuant to general rulemaking powers were automatically deemed interpretive. Today,
however, it is universally accepted that agencies can adopt legislative
rules pursuant to general rule-making powers.
For many years, the Supreme Court has been generous in its construction of agency rule-making powers. 179 Similarly, the agencies
have consistently been upheld when they have adopted rules that
circumvented adjudicatory hearings required by statute.180 The
most striking example of the broad construction of general rulemaking powers is the case of the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC). The statute establishing the FTC contained only a general rule-making power buried among its procedural and investigatory
provisions,181 and for many years the agency conceded that it had
no power to make legislative rules. Indeed, the legislative history
of the FTC statute seemed to establish rather convincingly that Congress meant to deny the FTC such power, intending that it rely solely
on adjudication to flesh out the contours of "unfair or deceptive acts
or practices" and "unfair methods of competition."182 Stung by criticism of its ineffectiveness, the FTC finally decided that it had au178. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 27; Lee,
supra note 90.
179. See, e.g., National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
180. See, e.g., FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33 (1964); United States v. Storer
Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956).
181. Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311 § 6(g), 38 Stat. 722 (1914) (cur-:
rent version at 15 U.S.C. § 46(g) (Supp. V 1975) ).
182. Shapiro, supra note 51, at 960.
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thority to adopt legislative rules. 183 Judicial affirmation of this claim
would furnish a significant procedural advantage to the Commission,
for it could then proceed against a respondent for violation of a rule
rather than the statute and thereby preclude relitigation of the underlying factual and policy basis of the rule. The FTC's power to adopt
legislative rules was ringingly upheld by the District of Columbia Circuit in National Petroleum Refiners Association v. FTC, and certiorari
was denied. 184
A similar development occurred in connection with the rulemaking of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The FDA
has many clear grants of legislative rule-making authority185 and also
has a general rule-making power under section 701(a) of its organic
statute. 186 For many years, it was not clear whether section 701(a)
conferred legislative rule-making power. 187 Although the point had
been canvassed by the lower courts, 188 the Supreme Court, in Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner, 189 seemed to assume that regulations
adopted under section 701(a) were legislative, and passed on to its
landmark analysis of ripeness. Recently, the Second Circuit
squarely confronted the issue. 190 It noted that attempts to draw a
hard and fast line between legislative and interpretive regulations
had been rather unrewarding because the line of demarcation is far
from clear. But the court recognized that if the administrative proc183. Earlier, the FfC' had adopted a middle course. In the famous cigarette
labeling opinion in 1964, the FfC investigated the economics of the tobacco industry
and the hazards of smoking. It adopted an interpretive rule requiring health warnings, and declared that it would take official notice of the results of its investigation
in subsequent adjudications against noncomplying cigarette manufacturers. See 29
Fed. Reg. 8324 (1964). However, there was doubt whether the FfC could preclude
relitigation of the factual bases of its interpretive rule. See K. DAVIS, supra note 51,
§ 5.04, at 258-63 (Supp. 1970); Robinson, The Making of Administrative Policy:
Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 491-96 (1970); Shapiro, supra note 51, at 964-68.
184. National Petroleum Refiners Assn. v. FfC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
185. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 341 (1970).
186. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act § 701(a), 21 U.S.C. § 371 (a)
( 1970).
187. See Forte, The GMP Regulations and the Proper Scope of FDA Rulemaki11g
Authority, 56 GEO. L.J. 688 (1968). See generally Cody, Authoritative Effect of
FDA Regulations, 24 FOOD, DRUG & COSMETICS L.J. 195 (1969); Shapiro, supra note
51, at 967-71.
188. See Abbott Laboratories v. Celebreeze, 352 F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965), revd.,
387 U.S. 136 (1967) (regulations held to be interpretive); Toilet Goods Assn. v.
Gardner, 360 F.2d 677, 686-87 (2d Cir. 1966), affd., 387 U.S. 158, 167 (1967) (irrelevant whether regulations are deemed interpretive or legislative).
189. 387 U.S. 136, 151-52 (1967).
190. National Nutritional Foods Assn. v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688 (2d Cir.
1975).
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ess is to be effective, specific regulations under general statutory
delegations of power have to be treated as authoritative, regardless
of whether they are labelled legislative or interpretive, especially in
areas where the agency possesses expertise not shared by the courts.
Where once it might have demanded proof of specific delegation of
legislative rule-making authority, the court stated that it had learned
from experience to accept a general delegation of power as sufficient
in certain areas of expertise. 101
In light of this trend, a theoretical distinction between legislative
and interpretive rules assumed to be present by Congress when it
approved the APA has been effectively erased. It would appear
that any agency having a general rule-making power can successfully
assert the power to adopt legislative regulations after notice and comment procedures, and thus take advantage of the truncated adjudications and narrowly circumscribed judicial review that attend legislative rules.
B.

Scope of Review

There exists a fundamental difference in the scope of judicial
review accorded legislative and interpretive rules. Indeed, one
reason the APA exempted interpretive rules from the preadoption
requirements was that such rules were thought to be subject to
plenary judicial review. 192 As Congress understood the difference
in 1946, interpretive rules were simply the agency's legal opinion,
as to which a court was free to substitute its judgment. Legislative
rules, on the other hand, were upheld if they were not arbitrary or
capricious and were rationally related to the purpose of the underlying statute. 103 If the validity of a regulation depended upon factual premises, the presumption of regularity required the court to
assume facts supporting the regulation. 194
Recent developments have sharply narrowed the gap between
the intensity of judicial review accorded legislative rules and that accorded interpretive rules. In the case of legislative rules, the verbal
formulation of the scope of the review has not changed,195 but the
actual scrutiny has become far more searching. This is not the place
191. See 512 F.2d at 696.
192. See note 55 supra.
193. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 53, at 115-20;
F. VoM BAUR, supra note 90, at 489. This remains the standard today under section
706(2)(A) of the Act. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 411
U.S. 356, 369 (1973).
194. See, e.g., Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
195. See note 193 supra.

564

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:520

for an extended discussion of this trend, but a sketch of some recent
developments is illuminating. 196 No longer are factual premises
always assumed to support the agency's policy decision. On the contrary, the whole record is rigorously examined to see whether they
do. 197 Under various verbal formulations, such as "clear error of
judgment,"198 the "hard look doctrine," 190 or the requirement of
"principled decision-making," 200 the rule must be a justifiable exercise of the agency's discretion. The agency must consider the comments directed toward it201 and must disclose and permit scrutiny
of its methodology. 202 Various procedural innovations have been
imposed on the agency to improve its decisionmaking and to facilitate review. 203 Its notice to the public must adequately alert those
with an interest at stake. 204 Its statement of basis and purpose has
to provide a comprehensive explanation of its reasoning. 205 The
196. See K. DAVIS, supra note 9, at 646-87.
197. See, e.g., Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620 (2d Cir.
1976); City of Chicago v. FPC, 458 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 1074 (1972). The court in the latter case specifically argued that the scope
of review of legislative regulations had to be searching so that the agency would not
be rewarded for casting its lawmaking in the form of rules rather than adjudications.
See generally Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
The Quest for the Optimum Forum, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 1, 39-52 (1975); Pedersen,
Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975); Verkuil, supra
note 80.
198. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16
(1971); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 507 (4th Cir. 1973).
199. Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
200. O'Donnell v. Shaffer, 491 F.2d 59, 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584, 598 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
201. See Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809, 814 (D.C.
Cir. 1975), noted in 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 402 (1975).
202. See Portland Cement Assn. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 392-93 (D.C. Cir.
1973); International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 643 (D.C. Cir.
1973 ).
203. See Thompson v. Washington, 497 F.2d 626, 643 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Mobil
Oil Corp. v. FPC, 483 F.2d 1238, 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1973); International Harvester
Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Appalachian Power Co.
v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 501 (4th Cir. 1973); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123
U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1305-15 (1975); Williams, "Hybrid Rulemaking" Under the Administrative Procedure Act: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 42 U. CHI. L. REV,
401, 425-26 (1975); Note, The Judicial Role in Defining Procedural Requirements
for Agency Rulemaking, 81 HARv. L. REV. 782, 782-83 (1974).
204. See Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215, 220 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 2224 (1976); Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809,
814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wagner Elec. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013, 1019-20 (3d
Cir. 1972).
205. See National Assn. of Food Chains, Inc. v. ICC, 535 F.2d 1308, 1314 (D.C.
Cir, 1976); Amoco Oil Co. v, EPA, 501 F,2d 722, 739 (D.C, Cir. 1974); Rodway
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agency can be compelled to clarify the portions of the rule that
the court considers too vague. 206 Finally, the statute and its legislative history are closely and critically scrutinized in order to ascertain whether the regulation is truly a reasonable implementation of
the statutory design. 201 Surely, this intensification of judicial review of legislative regulations is a development in administrative
law of fundamental significance.
At the same time, the judicial review accorded interpretive
regulations is far less intense than traditional statements about
substitution of judgment would indicate. 208 In fact, the courts
nearly always defer to interpretive regulations and to an agency's
interpretation of its own regulations. 209 Indeed, the standard of judicial review is sometimes stated in terms of whether a rule reasonably implements the statute---exactly the same test accorded legislative rules. 21° Consider, for example, this wholly typical quotation,
from a case involving a rule relating to administration of the public
land laws:
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court
shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the
officers or agency charged with its administration. "To sustain the
Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find
that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is
the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the
first instance in judicial proceedings." . . . When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue,
deference is even more clearly in order.
. . . If therefore, the Secretary's interpretation is not unreasonable,
if the language of the orders bears his construction, we must reverse
the decision of the Court of Appeals. 211
v. United States Dept of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Citizens Assn.
v. Zoning Commn., 477 F.2d 402,408 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
206. See Hooker Chem. & Plastic Corp. v. Train, 537 F.2d 620, 633, 639 (2d Cir.
1976); National Assn. of Independent Television Producers & Distribs. v. FCC, 516
F.2d 526, 539, 541 (2d Cir. 1975).
207. See, e.g., Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 213-29 (1973); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 379-86 (1969); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 811 (1965). When constitutional issues are implicated, the court's scrutiny of the
statutory basis for a regulation is particularly strict. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun
Wong, 422 U.S. 88, 105-14 (1976).
208. See note 55 supra.
209. See, e.g., Northern Indiana Pub. Serv. Co. v. Porter County Chapter, 423
U.S. 12 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Bowles
v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945); Gueory v. Hampton,
510 F.2d 1222, 1223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 499
F.2d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1974).
210. Much the same result is achieved by treating agency interpretations as questions of fact reviewable under the reasonableness approach of the substantial evidence
test. See, e.g., NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 350 U.S. 264, 269 (1956).
211. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1965) (emphasis added). In tax
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Of course, interpretive rules are occasionally subjected to plenary review and sometimes invalidated by the courts. But generally it appears likely that those regulations would have been equally invalid
if they had been legislative212 because the invalidity of the rule
seems conclusively mandated by the legislative history and policy. 213
Courts seldom employ the sort of free-wheeling substitution of judgment that the traditional model permits.
There are a number of factors that are generally considered
important in assessing the degree of deference that should be accorded an interpretive rule. 214 Among other factors, 210 an interpretive rule is more likely to be considered valid if it has been longstanding, was contemporaneous with the adoption of the statute, has
been consistently adhered to, or has been called to the attention of
Congress which approved it or reenacted the statute without change.
The fact that courts frequently focus on these criteria might suggest
that the process of review of interpretive rules is fundamentally different from the review accorded legislative rules, where these factors
are not expressly employed. But many of these factors are, in fact,
quite relevant in determining the validity of a legislative regulation
that might or might not reasonably implement the statutory design. 216 Further, many of the factors seem to be used as makeweights: Having decided whether the interpretive regulation is valid,
the court mentions all the factors it can muster that tend to support
its decision. 217
cases, the courts also uphold interpretive rules if they implement the statute "in some
reasonable manner." United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 307 (1967). See CocaCola Bottling Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 528, 532 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (legislative
tax regulation seemingly given same scope of review as interpretive regulations). BIii
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1964) (special
deference to legislative tax rule).
212. See H.M. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process 1320 (Tent. ed. 1958) (unpublished), which suggests that the task of statutory construction is the same whether
an interpretive or legislative rule is being reviewed.
213. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86 (1974); United States
v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546 (1973); Wilderness Socy. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917 (1973); Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th
Cir. 1969).
214. For a comprehensive discussion see 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, §§ 5.05-5.07,
at 314-38.
215. In Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), the Court considered
whether the interpretation was made in the course of the administrator's official
duties, whether it was based upon specialized experience and broad information and
investigation, the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and "all those factors
which gave it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140.
216. 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 5.06, at 329.
211. See, e.g., Helvering v. Reynolds, 313 U.S. 428 (1941).
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Although the techniques of reviewing interpretive and legislative
rules are converging, it would be undesirable if the differences were
wholly to disappear. Interpretations, after all, take many forms.
Some are carefully considered interpretive rules published in the
Federal Register, or closely reasoned legal conclusions reached in
formal adjudications. But other interpretations, such as advice
letters in response to inquiries from the public, generally receive
much less thoughtful analysis from the agency staff. In reviewing
various interpretive material, the courts should not be limited to the
narrow scope of review applicable to a legislative rule. Instead, they
should retain their power to substitute judgment on issues of law,
giving deference to the administrative interpretation when appropriate, but substituting judgment when the court's superior ability in
statutory construction or its broader policy perspective is called
for. 218 Nevertheless, the evolution in the intensity of judicial review
of both interpretive and legislative rules has seriously undermined
the judgment of the APA's draftsmen that the public should be excluded from interpretive rulemaking because the rules receive plenary judicial review.
C.

Ripeness

Another important development in contemporary administrative
law is the increasing availability of judicial review of rules prior to
their enforcement in adjudication. 219 There is authority for the view
that interpretations generally, and interpretive rules in particular, are
not ripe 'for preenforcement review. 220 Much of this authority, however, predates the Supreme Court's landmark analysis of ripeness in
Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 221 which contributed greatly to the
withering away of the ripeness doctrine as an obstacle to preenforcement review of administrative rules. Under the Abbott Laboratories
standard, the ripeness of agency action depends on the degree of practical harm to plaintiff from a delay in review, the fitness of the issues
for immediate review, and the injury to the public from immediate re218. However, if the public has participated in making the rule,_ and the agency
appears to have considered carefully the input it received from the public, the rule
might appropriately be given considerable deference by a reviewing court.
219. See generally Vining, Direct Judicial Review and the Doctrine of Ripeness
in Administrative Law, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1443 (1971).
220. See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Celebrezze, 352,F.2d 286 (3d Cir. 1965),
revd. on other grounds, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (interpretive rule); American President
Lines, Ltd. v. FMC, 316 F.2d 419 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (interpretive rule); Helco Prods.
v. McNutt, 137 F.2d 681 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 671 (1943) (advisory
letter).
221. 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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view. 222 Applying the Abbott Laboratories analysis, the courts have
found that interpretive rules, 223 as well as policy statements 2 :i 4 and
all sorts of informal agency action, 225 are susceptible to immediate
judicial review. For example, the District of Columbia Circuit held
the revenue ruling in the Eastern Kentucky case to be interpretive
but nevertheless reviewed it before it was applied. 226 Similarly, in
National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 221 an
opinion letter from the agency head to a trade association was held
ripe for review.
Interpretive rules, as well as policy statements, will be frequently
unripe for preenforcement review 228 because the practical harm
caused by an interpretive rule is often less serious than that caused
by a legislative rule. But Eastern Kentucky and National Automatic
Laundry, among other cases, illustrate that interpretive rules can
cause immediate practical harm that justifies immediate review. 220
Further, interpretive rules adopted without public participation may
not be suitable for review because of the lack of a record. 230 This
shortcoming is not conclusive, however, since some regulations
222. 387 U.S. at 148-56.
223. See, e.g., Frozen Foods Express v. United States, 351 U.S. 40 (1956); Independent Bankers Assn. v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Toilet Goods Assn.
v. Gardner, 360 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966), affd. on other grounds, 381 U.S. 158, 167
(1967); Gordon v. Federal Reserve Sys., 317 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Mass. 1970). For
the view that Frozen Foods involved preenforcement review of an interpretive rule,
see M. AsIMOW, supra note 88, at 115-17; L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMIN·
ISTRATIVE ACTION 405-06 (1965); Vining, supra note 219, at 1463 n.73. See also
National Assn. of Ins. Agents v. Federal Reserve Sys., 489 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 1968), in which the court, although acknowledging that interpretive rules arc
usually unreviewable, indicated that a strong showing of immediate and inescapable
effect might -permit preenforcement review.
224. E.g., Continental Air Lines v. CAB, 522 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1915);
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
225. E.g., Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 828 (1971) (seemingly cited with approval in Gordon
v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 690 n.15 (1975)); Medical Comm. for
Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as moot, 404 U.S.
403 (1972); Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
226. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization v. Simon, 506 F.2d 1278 (D.C. Cir.
1974), revd. on other grounds, 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976). However, in a dissenting
opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the ruling was not ripe for review. See 96 S. Ct.
at 1928.
227. 443 F.2d 689 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
228. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Continental Oil Co. v. Bums, 317 F. Supp. 194 (D. Del. 1970).
229. For a discussion of the practical harm caused by informal SEC action, see
Independent Broker-Dealers' Trade Assn. v. SEC, 442 F.2d 132 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
230. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 39-40 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

January 1977)

Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements

569

present strictly legal issues and can be reviewed without a record; 231
in other cases, the court could remand to the agency for the purposes
of building a record. 232
The fact that interpretive rules are susceptible to preenforcement
judicial review has a significant bearing on the issue of public participation. First, the decline of the ripeness doctrine marks the end
of yet another characteristic of interpretive rules traditionally assumed to distinguish them from legislative rules. Second, the record
produced would help the courts gauge more accurately the practical
impact of the rule and thus the need for preenforcement judicial review. Finally, the existence of a record facilitates substantive review
of the rule. The public's comments, and the agency's response to
them in its concise statement of basis and purpose, are of great value
to'the reviewing court. Even though the court frequently defers to
the agency's policy judgment, the existence of a record tends to assure the court that the agency has thoroughly considered all aspects
of the rule.
D.

Retroactivity

Another traditional difference between legislative and interpretive regulations is that legislative rules are generally prospective in
application233 while interpretive rules are frequently retroactive. 234
The theory was that a statute or legislative rule states the law; the
interpretive rule simply clarifies law that has existed all along.
This distinction is still meaningful, but the difference is less
significant than the theory would suggest. First, legislative regulations are often retroactive, either in their practical or their legal effect. For example, a prospective legislative rule can destroy business relationships that had been established in reliance on prior
law. 235 Moreover, like statutes, 236 explicitly retroactive legislative
regulations occasionally are valid. Thus in Addison v. Holly Hill
231. Surely, all legislative rules adopted without public participation because of
the military and foreign affairs exemption and proprietary functions exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 553(a) (1)-(2) (1970), are not immune from preenforcement review.
232. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
233. See Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Arizona Grocery
Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 284 U.S. 370, 389 (1932).
234. See Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965).
235. See Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939); South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,
5i1)4 F.2d 646, 678 (1st Cir. 1974); Robinson, supra note 183, at 517-18; Shapiro,
s11pra note 51, at 933-34.
236. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S. Ct. 2822 (1976).
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Fruit Products Co., 237 an originally promulgated regulation had been
found invalid and a replacement was adopted. Under these circumstances, the replacement regulation could be retroactive. In Thorpe
v. Housing Authority,238 the Supreme Court held that new regulations requiring notice and procedural protections for tenants evicted
from public housing must be applied retroactively by the local
housing authority to evictions occurring before they were adopted.
Still, these cases are exceptional; generally, agencies do not seek to
make their legislative regulations retroactive.
In accordance with traditional theory, interpretive regulations,
like decisions reached in adjudication, can legally be retroactive. 238
However, it seems reasonably clear that an agency can choose to
make an interpretive rule prospective only, 240 and many of them
have done so. 241 Indeed, the definition of "rule" in the APA strongly
suggests that all rules, interpretive and legislative, should be of
"future effect,"242 and new interpretations are explicitly required to
be prospective by statutes applicable to the Equal Employment
Opportunities Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of
Labor. 243 Courts may construe an ambiguous interpretation to have
237. 322 U.S. 607 (1944). More frequently, the courts deal with this situation
by ordering the invalidly adopted regulations to remain in effect until new ones can
be adopted. See, e.g., Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 514 F.2d 809,
817 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
238. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). See Maceren v. INS, 509 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1974);
General Tel. Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971); Certified Color
Indus. Comm. v. Flemming, 283 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1960); Steert v. Morgenthau, 116
F.2d 301 (D.C. Cir. 1940). See generally Note, Retroactive Operation of Administrative Regulations, 60 HARV. L. REV. 627 (1947).
239. See United States v. Zenith-Godley Co., 180 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1960),
alfd. per curiam, 295 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1961).
240. See Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Lyons, 7 Ill. 2d 95, 104-05, 129 N.E.2d 765,
770 (1955); 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 51, § 5.09; Note, supra note 238, at 633-34.
Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90 (1939), can be interpreted as approving
a prospective rule. Still, it is not definitely settled that interpretive rules can be confined to prospective application. See Baird, supra note 161; Berger, Estoppel Against
the Government, 21 U. CHI. L. REV. 680, 698-707 (1954).
241. See generally M. AsIMow, supra note 88, at 7-8, 30-31; Baird, supra note
161.
242. 5 u.s.c. § 551(4) (1970).
243. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970);
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (Supp. V 1975)
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970) ); Securities Act of 1933 § 19(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 775(a) (1970); Wage & Hour Division Act, 29 U.S.C. § 259 (1970). These statutes
protect persons relying on interpretations from retroactive changes. See generally
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1294 (2d Cir. 1973); M. AsIMOW,
supra note 88, at 30, 147, 185-86. Section 7805(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
authorizes the IRS to make all interpretations prospective. Under this statute
retroactive interpretations can be set aside as an abuse of discretion. See
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exclusively prospective effect, 244 and, according to the Supreme
Court, an interpretive regulation can create a reliance interest that
precludes a criminal prosecution for violation of the statute. 245
Another inhibition to retroactive changes in interpretive rules is
the principle that the agency is bound by its own rules. It cannot
depart from them in individual cases.246 Although this doctrine
usually is applied to procedural provisions, it seems equally applicable to interpretive rules. 247
Yet another barrier to retroactive changes in interpretive rules
are the doctrines of equitable estoppel and apparent authority.
Slowly but surely, these private law rules are becoming applicable
in actions against the government. Although strong Supreme Court
authority stands against this trend, 248 the lower courts on numerous
occasions have found ways to circumvent this authority in order to
prevent retroactive changes in position by the government from disturbing well-founded reliance interests. 249 The principles of estoppel and apparent authority probably will most frequently be applicable to cases of individual advice by the agency, rather than to interpretations of general applicability, since courts might be reluctant to
extend an estoppel to an unpredictably large group of persons. But
estoppel and apparent authority issues are equitable notions; their
application depends on a comparison of the detriment to the plaintiffs from enforcing the rule with the harm to the public from enjoining it. If the equities demand it, a court could easily hold that
the government abused its discretion by making, or was estopped
to make, a retroactive change in an interpretive rule of general applicability.
Chock Full O' Nuts Corp. v. United States, 453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Lynn & Gerson, Quasi-Estoppel and Abuse of Discretion as Applied Against
the United States in Federal Tax Controversies, 19 TAX. L. REv. 487 (1964); Comment, Limits on Retroactive Decision Making by the Internal Revenue Service: Redefining Abuse of Discretion Under Section 7805(b), 23 U.C.L.A. L.REv. 528 (1976).
244. See, e.g., Crespo v. United States, 399 F.2d 191 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
245. See United States v. Pennsylvania Indus. Chem. Co., 411 U.S. 655 (1973).
246. See Gardner v. FCC, 530 F.2d 1086, 1089-90 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
247. See, e.g., Vogt v. United States, 537 F.2d 405, 412-13 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Nader
v. Nuclear Regulatory Commn., 513 F.2d 1045, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Distrigas of
Mass. Corp. v. FPC, 517 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975); United States v. Ewig Bros.
Co., 502 F.2d 715, 725 n.34 (7th Cir. 1974). But see Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 495 F.2d 368 (8th Cir. 1974) (guidelines in manual not binding on agency);
Davis, Administrative Law -Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 15 CoLUM. L. REV. 823, 840
(1975). Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-96 (1976).
248. See M. As1MoW, supra note 88, at 33-37.
249. See United States v. Wharton, 514 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1975); M. ASIMOW,
supra note 88, at 37-59; Asimow, Estoppel Against the Government: The Immigration and Naturalization Service, 2 CHICANO L. REv. 4 (1975).
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Moreover, it seems clear that retroactive changes in the law resulting from adjudication may be set aside as an abuse of discretion.
As explained in SEC v. Chenery Corp., 250 a retroactive adjudicatory
change might be invalidated if the damage to reliance interests outweighed the mischief of allowing a particular case to escape the administrative clutches. Recently, in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace, 2 ri 1 the
Supreme Court permitted a retroactive change resulting from adjudication, but made it clear that such changes are not always permissible. Lower courts have occasionally set aside retroactive changes
reached through adjudication. 252 If retroactive changes resulting from
adjudication can be an abuse of discretion, it surely is clear that retroactive changes in interpretive rules can also be set aside. 253

E.

Waivers of Legislative Rules

It is often said that the effect of interpretive and legislative rules
differs when they are applied in subsequent adjudication. If the
rule is legislative, the agency applies the rule. If the rule is interpretive, the agency applies the statute. This distinction is significant,
but once again its importance can easily be overstated.
When a legislative rule is applied in adjudication, an agency must
permit parties to petition for a waiver of the rule. 254 This means
that the agency must consider whether it is appropriate to apply the
rule in the particular case. Similarly, when an interpretive rule is
applicable in an adjudication, the agency must decide whether to
follow the rule, find it inapplicable to the particular case, or even
revoke it. In practical terms, therefore, this difference between
legislative and interpretive rules is more illusory than real. In each
case, the agency will probably apply its rule to the parties before
it, but the agency must first consider whether application of either
a legislative or an interpretive rules is inappropriate.
250. 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
251. 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
252. See, e.g., NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1966);
NLRB v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1952). See generally Berger,
Retroactive Administrative Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 371 (1967).
253. It is somewhat anomalous, therefore, that law changes made in adjudications
probably cannot be made prospective only. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394
U.S. 759, 774-75 (1969). Evidently, changes in policy, if they are to be prospective,
must come through rulemaking.
254. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); United
States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956); Southwest Pa. Cable
Television, Inc. v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1343, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Claggett, Informal
Action-Adjudication-RUlemaking: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative Law, 1971 DUKE L.J. 51; Fuchs, Agency Development of Policy Through
Rulemaking, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 781,804 (1965).
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F. Summary
There remains a fundamental difference between legislative and interpretive rules. Legislative rules are made pursuant to delegated
legislative power, but interpretive rules represent the agency's view
of the meaning of the law. Notwithstanding this clear conceptual difference, much has occurred since 1946 to make the distinction between legislative and interpretive rules extremely blurry and, in many
situations, downright unnecessary. Since legislative rule-making
powers are broadly construed, many regulations once thought to be
interpretive are now legislative. The formerly clear differences with
respect to intensity of judicial review, ripeness, and retroactivity have
sharply narrowed. Since these traditional barriers are crumbling, it
should not be surprising that the courts have begun to erase still
another line by requiring notice and comment procedures before the
adoption of what traditionally would have been considered interpretive rules.
IV.

A PROPOSAL FOR POSTADOPTION PROCEDURES
FOR NONLEGISLATIVE RULES

As we have seen, the courts have repeatedly dealt with claims
that the public should be entitled to participate in the making of
interpretive rules and policy statements. The resolution of these
claims has been unsatisfactory. Under the legal effect test, the results are relatively predictable, but the courts have been oblivious
to the public's need to take part in the formulation of many rules.
Under the substantial impact test, the courts have been attentive to
the needs of the public, but the results have been unpredictable and
the conceptual basis of the decisions unclear. The problem thus
seems resistant to solution by ad hoc judicial decisions. Consequently, it seems worthwhile to consider whether the problem might
better be resolved through congressional amendment of the APA.
Before turning to an evaluation of proposed statutory changes, it is
helpful to summarize the values of public participation in rulemaking.

A. The Importance of Public Participation in Rulemaking
The APA introduced the concept of mandatory public participation in federal rulemaking. The concept of notice and comment
procedure is widely accepted as a truly progressive contribution to
better government. 2 ~5 The advantages of public participation in
255. See, e.g., K. DAVIS, supra note 61, at 65-68.
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rulemaking have been enumerated so often that there is little need
for this article to dwell on them in great detail. 256
The primary reason that public participation leads to better rules
is that it provides a channel through which the agency can receive
needed education. Agencies are not omniscient and do not have
all relevant economic and social data. They cannot anticipate all of
the consequences and problems that will flow from the adoption of
their rules. This sort of data is obtained by requiring the agency
to solicit and consider public comments. The interviews conducted
in connection with this study repeatedly indicated the practical value
that agency personnel attach to public commentary, including that
obtained in the course of adopting interpretive rules and policy statements. Public input also contributes to better rulemaking by offsetting institutional biases that may exist in favor of or against the
regulated group. Moreover, the public may be more likely to accept
and less likely to sabotage a rule if it has been allowed to participate
in its formulation. 2117
Public participation in rulemaking also has values that transcend
these instrumental ones. In our system of representative government, participation in governmental decisionmaking by persons affected by it is an affirmative good. This is particularly true in the case
of administrative agencies, which are not as politically responsive as
the legislature or the executive. Although theoretically subject to a
variety of legislative, executive, and judicial controls, most agency
action, and particularly rulemaking, is not supervised at aU. 2 GB
Agencies make laws affecting many interests behind closed doors;
their impartiality and freedom from pressures are frequently questioned. 259 Notice and comment procedures in rulemaking are ideally tailored to increase the responsiveness of the agency and to
facilitate democratic participation. They permit public participation
at a critical moment in administration when law and policy are about
256. See Bonfield, supra note 94, at 540-42; Cramton, The Why, Where and How
of Broadened Public Participation in the Administrative Process, 60 GEO. L.J. 525,
527-32 (1972); Comment, Due Process Rights of Participation ~n Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 886, 893-98 (1975). But see Koch, supra note 9,
at 1077-78.
257. For example, the parole board, while it did not find comments from prisoners particularly helpful in developing parole guidelines, indicated that the prisoners'
participation in formulating guidelines made the guidelines more acceptable to them.
258. See Cutler & Johnson, Regulation and the Political Process, 84 YALE L.J.
1395 (1975).
259. In response to this concern, the House Judiciary Committee, during the 94th
Congress introduced a bill that would require congressional scrutiny of regulations
before they become effective. H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. REC. 1280
(1976). However, the bill was rejected in the House.
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to crystallize, and they provide a powerful tool by which persons who
will be adversely or favorably affected by agency action can seek to
influence that action in an open fashion.
Public participation is no less necessary in the formulation of interpretive rules and policy statements than in legislative rulemaking.
The agency is as much in need of information when it interprets its
law or regulations, or when it formulates guidelines for exercising its
discretion, as it is when it imposes binding norms on the public. 260 As
we have seen, the impact of many interpretations or policy statements can be as great as that of legislative rules. And the democratic values of public participation are as well served by requiring
preadoption procedures in the formulation of nonlegislative rules as
in the formulation of legislative rules. Consequently, if the problem
is to be left to judicial resolution, I favor the use of the substantial
impact test, despite its uncertainty of application. However, perhaps
the best solution lies in congressional amendment of the APA, a
possibility that will now be considered.
B.

Repeal of the Exemption

One obvious statutory solution entails repeal of the exemption
for nonlegislative rules from the APA. This would open the process
to public participation and eliminate the need to distinguish between
legislative and nonlegislative rules. This proposal is ill-advised,
however, since two of the reasons for originally adopting the exemption .still seem persuasive. The APA draftsmen wished to encourage
the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements by not requiring burdensome procedures. They were also concerned by
the inappropriateness of mandating a single, rigid procedure for the
many forms that nonlegislative rulemaking may take. 261
Interviews with many agency personnel indicate nearly unanimous opposition to expansion of preadoption procedures to all interpretive rules and policy statements. This opposition is similar to
260. See Popkin, A Critique of the Rule-Making Process in Federal Income Tax
Law With Special Reference to Conglomerate Acquisitions, 45 IND. L.J. 453, 492513 (1970) (criticism of IRS published rulings).
261. The Senate Judiciary Committee staff wrote:
First, it is desired to encourage the making of such rules. Secondly, those types
of rules vary so greatly in their contents and the occasion for their issuance that
it seems wise to leave the matter of notice and public procedures to the discretion of the agencies concerned. Thirdly, the provision for petitions contained
in subsection (c) affords an opportunity for private parties to secure a reconsideration of such rules when issued. Another reason, which might be added, is
that 'interpretative' rules-as merely interpretations of statutory provisions--are
subject to plenary judicial review, whereas 'substantive' rules involve a maximum
of administrative discretion.
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 55, at 18.
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that voiced when Congress contemplated repeal of the exemptions
in the 1960's and to objections eloquently expressed by Professors
Kenneth Davis and Arthur Bonfield. 262
The objections to an extension of notice and comment procedures focus on a comparison of the proposal's costs and benefits.
One significant cost is that the proposal will substantially delay adoption of nonlegislative rules. As a practical matter, it is difficult to
nurse a controversial rule through the statutory procedures in less
than six months to a year. During that period, there is uncertainty
about whether the new rule will be adopted, and a less desirable
interpretation or policy may remain in effect. A second cost is the
substantial increase in workload that will result from a good faith
evaluation of a large volume of public comments. For example, organized letter-writing campaigns occasionally swamp the agency.
These burdens may divert agency personnel from more worthwhile
tasks. A third, related cost is that the agency may decide that nonlegislative rulemaking is not worth the trouble. It might simply refuse to adopt the interpretation or policy and instead deal with
the particular problem through case-by-case adjudication, private advice letters, individual contacts with the public, or informal internal
communication. This would deny the public the benefit of a generally applicable and well-publicized rule. If legislation seriously
inhibited the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements, it
would not serve the public interest.
These problems are particularly acute in agencies that issue substantial numbers of interpretations and policy statements. Consider,
for example, the operations instructions of the Immigration Service
or multi-volume staff manuals of the Internal Revenue Service or Occupational Safety and Health Administration. Many items that could
be considered interpretations of general applicability or general policy
statements are mixed in with merely procedural instructions. If the
agency were required to follow public notice and comment procedures
262. Professor Davis, expressing his opposition to the proposed legislation in testimony before Congress, argued that it would discourage the adoption of interpretive
rules and policy statements. See Administrative Procedure: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 150, 174 (1965). For the views of Professor Bonfield,
see Bonfield, supra note 9. Interestingly, Professor Bonfield favored the elimination
of exemptions under the Iowa statute. See Bonfield, The Iowa Administrative Procedure Act: Background, Construction, Applicability, Public Access to Agency Law, The
Rulemaking Process, 60 IowA L. REV. 731, 858-60 (1975). Professor Bonfield indicated that his change of position was motivated partly by a desire to see whether
the agencies would in fact substitute adjudication for rulemaking. Moreover, he
noted that the Iowa legislators were unalterably opposed to the exemption. Letter
from Arthur Bonfield to Michael Asimow (August 26, 1975).
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each time it wanted to amend its manual, its operations would be
seriously rigidified.
The benefits attending such a vast expansion of preadoption procedures would be slight. In all likelihood, the vast majority of interpretations and policy statements would elicit no public interest at all.
They would be either obviously correct, trivial in importance, or utterly noncontroversial. Some nonlegislative rules, of course, are
quite important and would generate significant commentary; such
commentary could well result in the modification of some rules.
From the point of view of both the public and the agency, however,
the costs seem clearly to outweigh the benefits of requiring preadoption procedures for all nonlegislative rules.
One response to these arguments, however, is that an agency can
eliminate some or all of the procedures for rulemaking if it finds
in good faith that such procedures are "unnecessary, impracticable,
or contrary to the public interest."263 By making this finding, the
agency could dispense with required notice and comment when the
rule is trivial or when it must be made effective immediately. Yet
the good cause exemption is not a complete answer to the problem,
since an issue of whether the agency had abused its discretion would
be raised each time the exemption was claimed. 264 An obstructionist litigating strategy would be open to anyone aggrieved by the
rule, 265 and the uncertainty of whether the good cause exemption was
proper might itself inhibit its use.
On the other hand, there might well be such massive utilization
263. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (B), 553(d) (3) (1970). See generally Bonfield, 71
L. REV. 222, supra note 94, at 291-315; Bonfield, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540,
supra note 94, at 588-608.
264. Generally, courts have upheld good cause findings. -See, e.g., Nader v. Sawhill, 514 F.2d 1034 (Erner. Ct. App. 1975); Reeves v. Simon, 507 F.2d 455, 458
(Erner. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975); De Rieux v. Five Smiths,
Inc., 499 F.2d 1321, 1322 (Erner. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 991 (1975);
Durkin v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 115 F. Supp. 118, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 1953), affd.
sub nom. Mitchell v. Edward S. Wagner Co., 217 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 964 (1955). However, good cause findings have also been rejected,
either because they were not explicit or the court disagreed with the agency's reasoning. See, e.g., Detroit Edison Co. v. EPA, 496 F.2d 244, 248 (6th Cir. 1974);
Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1969); American College of Neuropsychopharmacology v. Weinberger, No. 75-1187 (D.D.C. July 3, 1975); New York
v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Kelly v. Interior Dept., 339
F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (E.D. Cal. 1972).
265. But see Koch, supra note 9, at 1057. Professor Koch's view that the overall
amount of litigation would not be increased since procedural challenges would simply
be appended to substantive challenges to the rules is not persuasive. Many interpretive rules and policy statements are not ripe for immediate substantive review, see
text at notes 219-32 supra, but would be ripe for procedural challenges. Moreover,
many rules, which would not be challenged on substantive grounds, would be subject
to attack on procedural grounds because the likelihood of success is greater. Thus,
increased litigation would result.
MICH.

Michigan Law Review

578

[Vol. 75:520

of the good cause exemption that its use would become mechanical.
Consequently, the public might, in the end, be invited to participate
in the making of very few interpretive rules and policy statements.
Thus, by employing the good cause exemption, the agencies could
probably avoid the costs of public participation in their rule-making
processes, but only by returning to a pattern of exclusion that the reform was designed to remedy in the first place.
C.

Postadoption Notice and Comment

This article recommends that Congress amend the APA to require postadoption public participation for nonlegislative rules. 200
Under the recommended procedure, the agency could issue, amend,
or repeal its interpretive rules of general applicability and general
policy statements without giving any prior notice, allowing the
public to comment prior to adoption, or delaying the rule's effectiveness for a specified period. 267 However, publication of the rule in the
Federal Register or some other generally available form, like the
266. This proposal has been approved in substance by the Administrative Conference of the United States in Recommendation 76-5. This recommendation, addressed
to the agencies rather than Congress, suggests that postadoption commentary would
be good practice but does not suggest that the Act be amended:
1. Before an agency issues, amends, or repeals an interpretive rule of general
applicability or a statement of general policy which is likely to have substantial
impact on the public, the agency normally should utilize the procedures set forth
in Administrative Procedure Act subsections 553(b) and (c), by publishing the
proposed interpretive rule or policy statement in the Federal Register, with a
concise statement of its basis and purpose and an invitation to interested persons
to submit written comments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation.
If it is impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest to use such
procedures the agency should so state in the interpretive rule or policy statement,
with a brief statement of the reasons therefor.
2. Where there has been no pre-promulgation notice and opportunity for
comment the publication of an interpretive rule of general applicability or a
statement of general policy, even one made effective immediately, should include
a statement of its basis and purpose and an invitation to interested persons to
submit written comments, with or without opportunity for oral presentation,
within a following period of not less than thirty days. The agency should evaluate the rule or statement in the light of comments received. Not later than
sixty days after the close of the comment period, the agency should indicate in
the Federal Register its adherence to or alteration of its previous action, responding as may be appropriate to significant comments received. An agency may
omit these post-adoption comment procedures when it incorporates in the interpretive rule or policy statement a declaration, with a brief statement of reasons, that such procedures would serve no public interest or would be so burdensome as to outweigh any foreseeable gain.
ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF 'IHE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 76-5 (Dec.
10, 1976).
267. For a similar proposal, see L. WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN IRS CoNFL1CT
REsoLUTION PROCEDURES 67-68 (1971). The procedure has occasionally been employed by the agencies. See, e.g., 40 Fed. Reg. 30,936 (1975). However, the procedure appears to be unacceptable under present law if notice and comment procedures are otherwise required. See American College of Neuropsychopharmacology
v. Weinberger, No. 75-1187 (D.D.C. July 3, 1975).
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Internal Revenue Bulletin, would be accompanied by an invitation
to the public to comment on the rule. 268 Comments would be received for a substantial period of time, such as a minimum of sixty
days. The rule would also include a concise statement of its basis
and purpose, as is presently required for legislative rules. 269
The agency staff would then be required to evaluate the comments received and publish its response to them. As a result of
public reaction, the rule might be amended, repealed, or left intact,
but in any event, the agency would be obligated to defend its rule
by replying to the comments, as is presently required for conventional legislative rulemaking. 270 The statute would set a deadline
for the agency's reply, perhaps sixty days from the end of the comment period. During the postadoption period, the rule would be in
full force, unless the agency chose to give it a deferred effective date.
This proposal has a number of advantages. First, it would per~
mit the issuance of nonlegislative rules without delay. This would
be beneficial to both the agency and the public. It would minimize
confusion and uncertainty and allow the agency's chosen interpretation or policy to be applied immediately. Second, it would encourage the participation of the public by making it clear that the agency
would be required to consider interested persons' comments and
reply to them, and that a reviewing court would take the comments
and replies into account. Third, it would supply a record that would
facilitate judicial review. Fourth, it seems unlikely that this procedure would deter the agency from adopting interpretive rules and
policy statements. Finally, this approach seems a far better solution
than an abolition of the exemption for nonlegislative rules coupled
with reliance on the good cause exemption. If the rule is trivial or
268. A good cause exemption similar to those presently contained in sections 553
(b)(B) and 553(d)(3) of the Act should apply to the new procedure. Of course,
no postadoption comments need be solicited if the agency employed the preadoption
notice and comment procedure. One difficult issue is whether the postadoption procedure should apply to interpretive rules or policy statements adopted in adjudication.
The Administrative Conference recently adopted a recommendation that rules
adopted in adjudication be published in the Federal Register. ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF TIIE UNITED STATES, RECOMMENDATION 76-2 (1976). However, interpretive rules and policy statements adopted in adjudication probably should not be
subjected to mandatory posteffective public commentary. The parties to the adjudication have already furnished some input on the subject. Although the public probably
could contribute additional insights, given the present development of administrative
law concepts, it seems premature to insist on rule-making procedures for rules
adopted in adjudication. An introductory paragraph of Administrative Conference
Recommendation 76-5 specifically excludes rules adopted in adjudication from postadoption procedures. See note 266 supra.
269. See note 5 supra.
270. See text at note 205 supra.
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noncontroversial, nobody will comment on it, but if the rule is needed
because of an emergency, the agency can adopt it immediately without
fear that a court will disagree with its finding of emergency.
There are, of course, objections to this proposal. The most important criticism is that postadoption public commentary is far less
meaningful than preadoption commentary. According to this criticism, once an agency has adopted a rule in final form, the thinking
of its staff may have rigidified. Thus, the staff's reply to postadoption commentary might be a mere articulation of an already
hardened position rather than a principled response to suggested
modifications of the rule.
:Yhis objection is less persuasive than it might initially appear to
be. As a practical matter, it frequently happens that a proposed rule
has undergone extensive review by the staff before public notice is
given in compliance with preadoption procedures. Often the minds
of the staff are made up before the public is ever invited to participate.
In such cases, the public's commentary is viewed more as an annoyance than as a significant contribution. Nevertheless, it must be
admitted that postadoption commentary is less likely to influence the
final product than is preadoption commentary. However, if the staff
acts in good faith, it will reconsider its position in light of postadoption
comments; it must, after all, draft credible responses to them that
may well be scrutinized by a reviewing court.
A second criticism of a postadoption procedure is that it depends
upon the agency's publishing the rule in the Federal Register or in
some other generally available form. Although publication is already required by the APA, 271 agency compliance with the provision
is spotty272 and the courts do not strictly enforce it. 273 Moreover,
a good many interpretations and policy statements are in the form
of manuals or instructions to staff that need not be published but
only made available to the public. 274
This objection has some validity, but the problem of nonpubli271. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (D) (1970).
272. See E. Tomlinson, supra note 35, at 34-41; Newman, Government and Ignorance-A Progress Report on Publication of Federal Regulations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
929, 934-43 (1950).
273. See, e.g., Pesikoff v. Secretary of Labor, 501 F.2d 757 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038 (1975); Airport Comm. of Forsyth County v. CAB, 300
F.2d 185 (4th Cir. 1962); Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 824 (1976). In Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974), the Court
held that a legislative rule is ineffective without publication in the Federal Register.
While refusing to follow the agency's interpretation because it was inconsistent with
the congressional purpose, the court appeared willing to treat the rule as a validly
adopted interpretive rule even though it had not been published.
274. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2) (C) (1970).
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cation seems solvable. If the agency knows that its interpretive rules
and policy statements could be held invalid for want of public participation, and that participation can be triggered only by publication,
the agencies will have to reconsider their publication practices.
Similarly, to the extent that instructions to staff contain generally
applicable policy statements and interpretations, 275 these should be
extracted and published separately as rules. Here again, a little judicial enforcement would go a long way.
Many agencies will, no doubt, voice a third objection, that the
creation of postadoption procedures will increase their workload.
Staff must read, collate, evaluate, and respond to the public's comments, and they must adhere to a statutory time schedule in doing so.
Of course, even under present law, the public can always petition
for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule, 276 and agency response to such petitions takes time. Still, a systematized form of postadoption public commentary will likely generate more comments
than does the existing petition provision and agency costs will no
doubt be increased by it. However, the increase will be far less than
would occur if the present exemptions were simply repealed.
Overall, the benefits to the public from postadoption commentary
outweigh the modest additional costs that would be imposed on the
agency.
A fourth objection is that the proposal will fail to solve the definitional problem raised by section 4 of the APA. There will continue to be uncertainty about whether a rule is legislative, so that
preadoption procedure is required, or whether it is an interpretive
rule or a policy statement, so that postadoption procedure is sufficient. 277 The definitional problem can be greatly alleviated, how275. Since instructions to staff and manuals are now public information, see
Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1973); Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 79597 (6th Cir. 1972), the fact that they contain interpretive rules and policy statements
of general applicability will come to light. Persons aggrieved by them could argue
that they are invalid for lack of Federal Register publication and public participation.
276. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (19-70). Indeed, it could be argued that postadoption
procedures establish nothing more than is already provided in section 553. However,
there is a vast difference between a right to petition the agency and an invitation
by the agency for comments, together with an assurance that the agency will read
and respond to the comments within a fixed period of time.
277. Definitional problems exist on another level as well. Courts have determined that some agency behavior should not be treated as a rule at all. See, e.g.,
National Ornament & Elec. Light Christmas Assn. v. Consumer Prod. Safety
Commn., 526 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1975) (program in which volunteer deputies would
instruct retailers on how to test Christmas lights for defects, and report them to the
Commission, and inventory the lights was held not to be a rule); Illinois Citizens
Commn. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (speeches
by individual agency members were not treated as rules). Furthermore, some staff
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ever. For example, the statute could provide that if the agency
made a good-faith error in characterizing a new rule, the court could
treat the postadoption commentary procedure as an adequate substitute for the usual preadoption procedures. Thus, the agency's failure
to utilize preadoption procedures need not be grounds for declaring
the rule invalid and requiring a new and probably fruitless cycle of
rulemaking. It would often be better if the court could say to the
agency: "You have erred. This is a legislative rule, not a policy
statement or interpretive rule, but your error seems to have been
in good faith. The postadoption procedures that you used were a
close enough substitute for the usual preadoption procedures. Consequently, your error was not prejudicial and the rule will be allowed
to stand." The court would also have the option, of course, of ordering a new cycle of preadoption rule-making procedure, and it
would clearly want to do so if the agency seemed to make it a practice to misuse postadoption procedures.
In fact, a new statute might even disapprove the substantial impact test entirely, causing the courts to return to the much clearer
legal effect test. This amendment might adopt the legal effect standard, so that it would never be an abuse of discretion for the agency
to dispense with preadoption procedures for rules that are labelled
as interpretive or policy statements, regardless of their impact. Although such an approach would clarify the law, it would do so at a
significant cost, and thus it is not recommended. The courts should
retain the power to impose additional preadoption procedural requirements on agencies seeking to enact unusually significant nonlegislative rules.
Finally, opponents of any proposal to impose procedural requirements on nonlegislative rulemaking might complain of unclear
consequences for agency failure to follow the required procedures.
Suppose the invalidly adopted rule reflects the best interpretation
or policy, or even the only correct one. Would the agency be required to substitute an inferior interpretation for the proper one, or
to exercise its discretion in a manner inconsistent with its well-considered policies? Would the court always have to remand to the
agency for a new rule-making procedure, even though the result is
a foregone conclusion?
There is no simple answer to these questions and different
courses of action would seem appropriate in different situations.
Assume, for example, that an invalidly adopted rule represents a
positions might be classified as not having been "adopted by the agency." See M,
AsIMow, supra note 88, at 8S-88.

January 1977]

Interpretive Rules and Policy Statements

583

change in prior law or practice that might upset legitimate reliance
interests or impose considerable individual hardship. Assume also
that there would be little or no harm to the public in a holding that
the new rule is invalid and the old one continues in effect. In this
situation, the reviewing court could well find the new rule invalid
and require the agency to comply with statutory procedures. The
two immigration cases discussed in this article, Lewis-Mota v. Secretary of Labor218 and Noel v. Chapman, 219 are illustrations of such
situations. Nothing prevents the court from requiring the agency to
retain its prior law or practice until a change is effected with proper
procedures. 280
There might also be cases in which the courts should refuse to
allow an invalidly adopted interpretive rule or policy statement to
be considered in litigation. The agency would therefore lose the
advantage of judicial deference customarily accorded its interpretations or policies. 281
Finally, consider the situation in which the new interpretation or
policy is undoubtedly a correct one-perhaps the only correct oneand its adoption is therefore inevitable. Assume further that it represents no change in prior law or policy and that no private reliance
interests could be based upon a contrary position. In this situation,
the court could easily decide to let the invalidly adopted rule or
policy stand. The agency might have erred, but its error was not
a prejudicial one, and it would be a waste of time and effort to remand to the agency. 282 A possible illustration is the press release
involved in Airport Commission of Forsyth County v. CAB, 283 where
it would have been absurd to reverse the CAB's determination,
which was so obviously correct, in order to start anew a process that
could only yield the same result.
All that can be said is that reviewing courts must decide on a
case-by-case basis precisely how to deal with invalidly adopted inter278. See text at notes 114-19 supra.
279. See text at notes 82-87 supra.
280. See City of New York v. Diamond, 379 F. Supp. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Gardner v. Tarr, 341 F. Supp. 442 (D.D.C. 1972).
281. A bill, which has been favorably reported by the House Judiciary Committee, contains a provision in respect to rules adopted without appropriate procedures
that "no person shall be required to resort to or be adversely affected by such a rule,
nor may such a rule be admitted into evidence or considered in any agency proceeding or any judicial review of such proceeding . . . ." H.R. 12048, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976). See H.R. Rep. 94-1014, pt. 1, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51 (1976).
282. See NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 579 (1969); NLRB v. APW
Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
283. See text at notes 63-64 supra.
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pretations and policy statements. Just as courts have found a
variety of ways to prevent retroactive changes in agency positions, 284
so too can they compel the agency to adhere to an interpretation
or a policy that the agency wants to change. In other situations, such
a result would be absurd; the court could permit the change, with
or without a remand for a new rule-making proceeding.
V.

CONCLUSION

The courts have pursued inconsistent theories in evaluating
claims by the public that preadoption procedures should have been
employed in the adoption of interpretive rules and policy statements.
Some of them have looked only to legal effects and labels; this
achieves some predictability of result, but at the cost of rejecting
well-founded claims that the public was wrongfully excluded from
the agency's deliberative processes. Other courts have considered
only the practical impact of the rule. This approach insures public
participation in rulemaking but injects an element of unpredictability.
Abolition of the present statutory exemption would not serve
the interests of the public or the agency. Repeal of the exemption
would have an adverse effect on the functioning of the federal
government; its disadvantages would clearly outweigh its advantages. Moreover, repeal would probably lead to overuse of the good
cause exemptions, thereby inviting obstructionist litigants to abuse
the system and possibly excluding the public to nearly the same degree as it is presently excluded. It would be far better to create
a new system for postadoption comment and mandatory agency
responses. Such a provision would realize most of the benefits of
preadoption commentary without imposing severe costs and delays
and possibly driving much rulemaking underground. As part of a
needed reform of the rule-making provisions of the APA, such a
system deserves sympathetic consideration by Congress.
284. See text at notes 244-53 supra.

